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Abstract
We introduce a class of financial contracts involving several parties by extending the notion
of a two-person game option to a contract in which an arbitrary number of parties is involved and
each of them is allowed to make a wide array of decisions at any time, not restricted to simply
‘exercising the option’. The collection of decisions by all parties then determines the contract’s
settlement date as well as the terminal payoff for each party. We provide sufficient conditions
under which a multi-person game option has a unique arbitrage price, which is additive with
respect to any partition of the contract.
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1
2 Multi-Person Game Contingent Claims
1 Introduction
In financial markets, almost all traded derivatives effectively involve only two parties, the issuer and
the holder. Furthermore, in most cases, the only meaningful decision lies with the holder in the form
of exercising the contract. Some exceptions to this include the two-person game options introduced
by Kifer [24] in which the issuer also has decisions to make (see also Dolinsky and Kifer [6], Dolinsky
et al. [7], Kallsen and Ku¨hn [20], Ku¨hn et al. [26], Kyprianou [27] and a review paper by Kifer [25]).
From the practical perspective, one may refer to convertible bonds as real-world financial derivatives
covered by the general concept of the two-person game option (see, for instance, Ayache et al. [1],
Andersen and Buffum [2], Bielecki et al. [3], or Kallsen and Ku¨hn [21]). No wonder that the existing
mathematical theory of pricing financial derivatives is mainly concerned with bilateral deals. By
contrast, our goal is to open a new avenue by designing an extended framework in which one may
define and evaluate contingent claims involving several parties.
In a general version of a multi-person contingent claim introduced in this work, an arbitrary
number of parties is involved and each of them is allowed to make a wide array of decisions at any
time, not restricted to simply ‘exercising the option’. Decisions of all parties then determine the
settlement time of the claim, as well as their respective terminal payoffs. Since one may draw equiv-
alences between the mechanisms of multi-person financial contracts and general stochastic games
examined in Guo and Rutkowski [11, 12, 13], we propose the name multi-person game contingent
claims or multi-person game options. We work throughout within the discrete or continuous-time
arbitrage-free market model with the intention of adding multi-person game contingent claims to
this market. The generalised framework proposed here is not restricted to one particular issue,
but has instead several purposes. First, it allows for the creation and valuation of new complex
derivatives involving multiple parties. Second, it provides fresh insights to the valuation of existing
exotic derivatives. Finally, the framework may serve as a starting point to a unified approach of
modelling financial derivatives in the presence of external factors, such as: credit risk, funding costs,
and margin account (see, for instance, [4, 31]). For instance, one may ask how the fact that external
funders can make meaningful decisions in their own interest may affect the valuation of a contract
between either two or several counterparties.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the definition of a multi-person game
contingent claim, which is associated with a multi-player stochastic game of perfect information. The
claim involves several holders of parts of a contract (dubbed tranches), as well as its issuer. Since
each party is able to observe the actions of others, this information is reflected in their decisions and
hedging portfolios. As a result, admissible trading strategies are redefined as H-predictable trading
strategies, which also involve reactions to the observable actions of all parties. An enter-and-hold
arbitrage is defined in a natural way as the opportunity to make a guaranteed profit by holding
tranches along with an H-predictable trading strategy until the claim is settled.
Section 3 focusses on the pricing of a particular combined tranche, that is, a fixed collection
of tranches. To establish the no-arbitrage bounds for a combined tranche, it suffices to consider a
holder of that tranche and to postulate that the issuer is holding all remaining tranches of a contract.
The main results in this section are Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, for the discrete and continuous-time case,
respectively. They show that, under some sensible conditions on payoffs, no enter-and-hold arbitrage
is possible for a fixed combined tranche if and only if its price lies within a particular interval. The
bounds of this interval are then interpreted in terms of super-hedging strategies.
In Section 4, we consider in addition the interaction between different combined tranches. In
particular, we demonstrate that prices of single tranches of a multi-person game option must be
additive in order to avoid a second type of arbitrage, dubbed the immediate reselling arbitrage.
We show that the additivity of prices also eliminates any price disagreement between the parties.
Theorem 4.1 furnishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-existence of both types
of arbitrage opportunities. Theorem 4.2 proves that if optimal equilibria exist for the associated
multi-player game, then all individual tranches of a game contract have unique arbitrage prices,
which match the values of the game. Furthermore, if the payoffs satisfy a sub-zero-sum condition,
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then every combined tranche has a unique arbitrage price, which is also additive. For the reader’s
convenience, the pertinent definitions and results from the game theory are collected in the appendix.
1.1 Multi-Person Contract with Puttable Tranches
For concreteness, let us consider a continuous-time complete market model of a single stock, e.g., the
Black-Scholes model. Our goal is to examine arbitrage pricing of contracts involving several parties.
One of them, called the issuer, plays a special role – he initiates (‘sells’) the contract and takes care
of its settlement according to the rules specified below. All other m parties are referred to as the
holders of tranches of a contract. We give below an example of a simple contract between the issuer
and m holders. In Section 4.5, we show how to value this contract using no-arbitrage principles.
1.1.1 Two-Period Setup
We consider dates 0 < T1 < T2 = T and we assume that at time 0 each holder buys a tranche,
formally represented by a call or put option of either European or American style. Options may
have different strikes, but they share the same expiry date T , and they cannot be exercised before
the date T1. At time T1, each holder has the right to give back (that is, to put) the tranche to
the issuer. If the ith holder decides to put the tranche he owns, then he receives from the issuer
an FT1-measurable amount X
i
1 specified in the contract. We denote the set of such holders by E .
If all holders decide to put the tranche to the issuer at time T1, then he simply pays all amounts
X11 , . . . , X
m
1 to holders. However, if at least one holder decides to keep his tranche, then the contract
stipulates that the issuer computes his total deviation (the ‘total loss’) at time T1, as given by the
sum
∑
i∈E(X
i
1 − P
i
1) where P
i
1 is the price of the ith option at time T1, and the total loss of the
issuer is covered by the holders who decided to keep their tranches.
For simplicity, we assume that the redistribution is split evenly amongst the holders who decided
to keep the tranche, so that each of them should pay the issuer the amount of 1
k
∑
i∈E(X
i
1 − P
i
1)
where k = m−|E| is the number of such holders, although more general redistribution rules can also
be implemented (see [11, 12, 13]). We note that it is possible to choose strikes K1, . . . ,Km, classes
of options (calls or puts), and the amounts X11 , . . . , X
m
1 to ensure that it will be not ‘optimal’ for
all holders to put their tranches to the issuer at time T1. Specifically, the amounts X
1
1 , . . . , X
m
1 may
be chosen small enough so that there exists at least one holder for which it would be suboptimal
to put his tranche, even when all other holders would prefer to do so. It is natural to conjecture
that in this situation the issuer’s ‘total valuation’ problem will reduce to the valuation of individual
options, since holders’ decisions at time T1 will not affect him. This means that the sum of prices
of ‘tranches’ at time 0 should be equal to the sum of prices of options. However, the price at time
0 of a tranche does not necessarily coincide with the price of the corresponding option, due to the
redistribution of payoffs at time T1.
1.1.2 Multi-Period Setup
Let us now consider the dates 0 < T1 < T2 < · · · < Tn < Tn+1 = T . Each holder buys a tranche
represented by an option expiring at T , which cannot be exercised before Tn. To describe the
mechanism of the contract, let us fix some l = 1, 2, . . . , n. At time Tl, each current holder has
the right to put the tranche to the issuer. If the ith holder decides to do so, then he receives a
predetermined FTl-measurable amount X
i
l . We denote the set of such holders by El. If all tranches
are given back to the issuer at time Tl, then he pays all amounts X
1
l , . . . , X
m
l to holders. If at least
one holder decides to keep his tranche, then the issuer computes his ‘total loss’ at time Tl, which
is given by the sum
∑
i∈El
(X il − P
i
l ) where P
i
l is the market price (continuation value) of the ith
tranche at time Tl. The price P
i
l of tranche i is computed assuming that no putting of any tranche
occurs at Tl (in other words, before holders decisions at time Tl were announced). The total loss
of the issuer is covered by the holders who decided to keep their tranches. The redistribution is
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split evenly amongst the holders who decided to keep the tranche at Tl, meaning that each of them
compensate the issuer by paying him at time Tl the amount of
1
k
∑
i∈El
(X il −P
i
l ) where k = m−|El|
is the number of such holders. After the redistribution stage has been completed, we move on to
the next date Tl+1, with the issuer being the new holder of tranche i for all i ∈ El. Then he can
make any decisions available to the holder of tranche i from time Tl+1 onwards. He can also sell
some or all of these tranches to new holders and thus relinquish the corresponding decision-making
abilities. We repeat these steps until the decisions and redistributions at date Tn are completed. At
this moment, the tranches revert back to original options.
2 Multi-Person Game Options
All of the following definitions refer to an underlying probability space (Ω,F ,P), which is endowed
with the filtration F = {Ft : t ∈ [0, T ]} representing the information flow observed by all market par-
ticipants. In continuous-time setup, the filtration F is also assumed to satisfy the ‘usual conditions’
that underpin stochastic calculus. We denote by B,S1, . . . , Sd the F-adapted processes representing
prices of primary traded assets. For simplicity of presentation, it is postulated throughout that
the underlying market model (which is left largely unspecified) is frictionless, arbitrage-free, and
complete. Hence, according to the classic version of FTAP, the unique martingale measure, denoted
by Q, is available. For a detailed description of discrete-time case (continuous-time case, resp.), we
refer to Jacod and Shiryaev [17] (Jeanblanc et al. [18], resp.). Further technical assumptions about
the continuous time model will be stated in Section 3.5.
2.1 Actions, Outcomes and Strategy Profiles
Consider an arbitrary game G with player set given by M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} and the space of actions
A =
∏
i∈MA
i. We assumed that each Ai is a finite (or infinite, but countable) set representing
actions available to player i at any time. Unless otherwise stated, the definitions cover both discrete-
and continuous-time cases. In particular, [t, u] denotes the set {t, . . . , u} when a discrete-time
framework is studied. Note also that the convention [0, t) = [0, t− 1] := {0, . . . , t− 1} is used in that
case for t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
Definition 2.1. An outcome for party i is an F-adapted process hi = (hit : t ∈ [0, T ]) with values
in Ai. It represents the actions of party i over time. The space of outcomes for party i is denoted
by Hi. We write h = (h1, . . . , hm) and H =
∏
i∈MH
i to denote the m-tuple of outcomes and its
space, respectively.
We will frequently consider a sequence of actions up to, and possibly including, a certain time
t ≤ T . For any outcome h ∈ H, the history before time t is the restriction of h to the time
interval [0, t). We denote it by h[0,t) and we write H[0,t) to denote the space of such histories. Also,
we define h[0,t] and H[0,t] in a similar way. The following technical assumption is relevant in the
continuous-time case only, in which case it will be indeed crucial.
Assumption 2.1. Every outcome hi ∈ Hi for every i ∈M is a right-continuous process.
Many aspects of a game only depend on the past history only. To quantify this notion, let us
consider a mapping f :H× [0, T ]×Ω→ C with values in some space C. For any h, h′ ∈ H, we define
the random time
ρ(h, h′) := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : ht 6= h
′
t
}
∧ T. (2.1)
Then ρ(h, h′) is an F-stopping time, since the outcomes h and h′ are F-adapted. Obviously, for every
t ∈ [0, T ], the event {h[0,t) = h
′
[0,t)} coincides with {t ≤ ρ(h, h
′)}.
Definition 2.2. A mapping f :H× [0, T ]× Ω→ C is H-adapted (H-predictable, resp.) if for every
h, h′ ∈ H, the equality f(h) = f(h′) holds on the stochastic interval [[0, ρ)) (on [[0, ρ]], resp.) where
ρ = ρ(h, h′).
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It is clear that if a mapping f is H-predictable then it is also H-adapted. Intuitively, a mapping
f is H-adapted (H-predictable, resp.) if, for all t ∈ [0, T ], the value ft(h) depends only on h[0,t] (on
h[0,t), resp.). Informally, for an H-adapted (H-predictable, resp.) mapping f one could thus write
ft(h) = ft(h[0,t]) (ft(h) = ft(h[0,t)), resp.) for every h ∈ H and t ∈ [0, T ].
A strategy for player i specifies how she should react to the observable actions of other parties.
It is mapping from the space H of outcomes to the set Ai of actions, which also takes into account
the information flow represented by the filtration F.
Definition 2.3. A strategy of party i is an F-adapted and H-predictable mapping si : H× [0, T ]×
Ω→ Ai. The m-tuple of strategies s = (s1, . . . , sm) is called a strategy profile. We denote by Si (S,
resp.) the space of all possible strategies of party i (strategy profiles, resp.).
We define the mappings s[0,t) ∈ S[0,t) and s
i
[0,t) ∈ S
i
[0,t) in an obvious way. Note also that
wherever the superscript i ∈ M appears, it can be replaced by an arbitrary subset N ⊆ M to
describe the corresponding notion relating to N . Moreover, −N is a shorthand notation forM\N .
It will be frequently convenient to write
s = (τ, σ) = (sN , s−N ) ∈ SN × S−N . (2.2)
Definition 2.4. For any strategy profile s ∈ S, we denote by h(s) ∈ H the outcome associated to
s, that is, the unique outcome obtained when a strategy profile s is played on [0, T ].
It is natural to define a game by first specifying the class Si of all strategies available to each
player and, subsequently, to define Hi and H as the sets of all outcomes associated with all possible
strategy profiles s ∈ S. This specification underpins all definitions and results stated in what follows.
Let us now consider the game at time t. We assume that at any date t the sample path of the
history h[0,t)(s) (but not the mapping s[0,t) used to generate this sample path) is observed by all
parties. For any fixed s = (τ, σ) ∈ S and N ⊆ M, we define the set SNt (s) of strategies available
to players from the set N at time t after a strategy profile s[0,t) ∈ S[0,t) was played. Formally, the
subset SNt (τ, σ) ⊆ S
N is given by
SNt (τ, σ) :=
{
τ ′ ∈ SN : h[0,t)(τ
′, σ) = h[0,t)(τ, σ)
}
. (2.3)
2.2 Multi-Person Game Contingent Claims
We first formulate a general definition of a multi-person game contract. An important ingredient
of a contract is a decision to terminate it, which may be chosen by any party i provided, of course,
that this possibility belongs to the action set Ai. In an abstract formulation of a game claim, it will
be enough to introduce the concept of the termination mapping through the following definition.
Assumption 2.2. The termination mapping Θ :H× [0, T ]× Ω→ {0, 1} satisfies:
(i) for every h ∈ H, the process Θ(h) is F-adapted, non-decreasing and RCLL,
(ii) the mapping Θ is H-adapted.
For any h ∈ H, the termination date is defined by
ϑ(h) = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Θt(h) = 1}. (2.4)
Note that ϑ(h) ∈ T[0,T ] for every h ∈ H, where T[0,T ] stand for the class of all F-stopping times with
values in [0, T ]. Condition (ii) in Assumption 2.2 means that for every h, h′ ∈ H, if h[0,t] = h
′
[0,t]
and ϑ(h) = t then ϑ(h′) = t. Given a strategy profile s and the associated outcome h(s), we denote
by ϑ(s) the termination date ϑ(h(s)). Let Vϑ(s)(s) = (V
1
ϑ(s)(s), . . . , V
m
ϑ(s)(s)) stand for the vector
of random payoffs, which are received by holders at time ϑ(s) if a strategy profile s is played or,
equivalently, if the outcome h(s) is realised. Each particular payoff V iϑ(s)(s) will be identified with a
single tranche of a contract.
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Assumption 2.3. The payoff mapping V :H× [0, T ]× Ω→ Rm satisfies:
(i) for every h ∈ H, the processes V 1(h), . . . , V m(h) are F-adapted and RCLL,
(ii) the mapping V is H-adapted.
In the classic case of a two-person game option, as defined in Kifer [24], one deals with two
tranches, which are held by a holder and an issuer, respectively. Note that, despite being attributed
different names, their roles and rights are here identical. It should thus be stressed that in a multi-
person game claim the role of the issuer will be essentially different from that of ordinary holders.
We use the symbol G to denote a generic game that underpins the specification of a multi-person
game contingent claim. For explicitly defined classes of multi-player stochastic stopping games and
results on the existence of an optimal equilibrium, we refer to [11, 12, 13]. The definition and basic
properties of an optimal equilibrium are also given in the appendix.
Definition 2.5. A multi-person game contingent claim MGC(G) is a contract on [0, T ], which
consists of m tranches, between an issuer and up to m holders. At time 0, a prospective holder of
tranche i has to pay the issuer some fee (possibly negative) to enter the contract; we denote this
amount by pii0(G). Any individual party, including the issuer, is allowed to hold any combination
of tranches. Once the contract starts, the holder of tranche i may choose a strategy si ∈ Si, and
decisions of all holders form a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sm). The contract is settled at time
ϑ(s) ∈ T[0,T ] where the issuer pays the holder of tranche i the amount of V
i
ϑ(s)(s) for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
In the real-world financial contracts, all cashflows are zero-sum in nature. Since a game G is not
postulated to be zero-sum, the crucial role of the issuer in MGC(G) is to absorb any surpluses or
cover any deficits at times 0 and ϑ(s). Consequently, the net cashflow between the holders of the m
tranches and the issuer is always zero. If G happens to be zero-sum, meaning that
∑
i∈M Vϑ(s)(s) = 0
for all s ∈ S, then the issuer is somewhat redundant, since the holders can strike the deal between
themselves at time 0 and then also settle the payoffs between themselves at time ϑ(s) without issuer’s
intervention. In practice, the role of an issuers is then reduced to a clearing house or intermediation.
Remark 2.1. One may also reinterpret the issuer as the holder of an issuer’s tranche, so that
MGC(G) becomes a zero-sum game contract with m+1 tranches in which the holder of the (m+1)th
tranche is not allowed to take any actions. This corresponds to the concept of a dummy player in
[13]. Formally, the analysis of a game would then reduce to the zero-sum case.
Remark 2.2. The contract introduced in Definition 2.5 extends, in particular, the classic game
option introduced in Kifer [24], which corresponds to a Dynkin stopping game between two players.
The ‘holder’ owns the tranche, which allows for ‘exercising’, whereas the second holder (dubbed the
‘issuer’) keeps the tranche allowing for ‘cancellation’. In the classic game options, there is no need to
introduce an issuer in the sense of Definition 2.5, since the classic game option is associated with a
zero-sum stopping game. Aside from the number and roles of parties involved, we also generalise the
two-person game option by allowing a greater complexity in the underlying game G. In particular,
the analysis presented in what follows is by no means restricted to the case of stopping games.
2.3 Adaptive Trading Strategies
Let MGCt(G, s) denote the multi-person game contingent claim on [t, T ] after the strategy profile
s[0,t) ∈ S[0,t) was played during [0, t). Strictly speaking, MGCt(G, s) only depends on the history
h[0,t)(s), meaning that if the equality h[0,t)(s) = h[0,t)(s
′) holds, where s′ is any strategy profile,
then the game claims MGCt(G, s) and MGCt(G, s′) are in fact identical. To simplify presentation,
we implicitly work under the event {ϑ(s) ≥ t} when dealing with MGCt(G, s). In other words, we
only consider the case where MGCt(G, s) has not yet been terminated before time t.
Denote each single tranche i ∈ M by MGCi(G) and the collection of single tranches N ⊆ M,
dubbed a combined tranche N , by MGCN (G). We will simply use the term tranche when no
ambiguity may arise. For each i ∈ M and N ⊆ M, let MGCit(G, s) and MGC
N
t (G, s) denote the
tranche i and the tranche N at time t, respectively.
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Let us now describe trading arrangements after the contract’s initiation. At any time t before the
settlement time, all tranches of MGCt(G, s) may be freely traded, so that the holder of the tranche i
may sell it to a new holder. The new holder then continues the game with the other current holders
and has the ability to choose a strategy τ ∈ Sit(s) from time t onwards. Denote the time t price of
the tranche i (tranche N , resp.) by piit(G, s) (pi
N
t (G, s), resp.). Let us stress that anyone, including
the issuer, is allowed to hold any number of tranches at any time.
The pricing of game options hinges on no-arbitrage arguments and the replication (or super-
hedging) of payoffs. In the current framework, every party (the issuer and holders) may hold a
portfolio of stock and bonds in order to hedge her future liabilities. Since G is a perfect information
game, in which actions exist before ϑ(s) and are observed by all parties, it is natural for the issuer
and the holders to adapt their trading strategies according to their current and past observations.
In particular, if a strategy profile s ∈ S is played, a trading strategy should have a non-anticipative
dependency on the observable outcome h(s) ∈ H. This leads to the following definition in which it is
implicitly assumed that the class of admissible (thus, in particular, self-financing) trading strategies
for a given market model (B,S) was already specified (for instance, by focussing on trading strategies
for which the discounted wealth is a (Q,F)-martingale).
Definition 2.6. An H-predictable trading strategy is a mapping φ :H× [0, T ]×Ω→ Rd+1 satisfying
the following conditions:
(i) for every h ∈ H, φ(h) is an admissible trading strategy,
(ii) φ is an H-predictable mapping.
The class of all H-predictable trading strategies φ is denoted by Φ(H). For any φ ∈ Φ(H), the
corresponding wealth mapping Z :H× [0, T ]× Ω→ R, which is given by the equality
Zt(φ(h)) =
d∑
l=0
φlt(h)S
l
t, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ],
is also H-predictable. We will need to extend Definition 2.6 a little further. For a fixed σ ∈ S−N ,
we denote by Hσ the set of all outcomes reachable when a strategy σ is played, that is,
Hσ :=
{
h ∈ H : h = h(τ, σ), τ ∈ SN
}
. (2.5)
In some situations, where possible outcomes are assumed to belong to Hσ, we may be only interested
in trading strategies with the same constraint and restricted to the interval [t, T ].
Definition 2.7. For any σ ∈ S−N and t ∈ [0, T ], we denote by Φt(Hσ) the class of allHσ-predictable
trading strategies φ :Hσ× [t, T ]×Ω→ Rd+1. The classes Hτ and Φt(Hτ ) are defined in an analogous
manner.
Intuitively, Definition 2.7 has the following interpretation: when a strategy profile σ is fixed then,
for every u ∈ [t, T ] and τ, τ ′ ∈ SN , the equality h[0,u)(τ, σ) = h[0,u)(τ
′, σ) implies that Zu(φ(τ, σ)) =
Zu(φ(τ
′, σ)). One could thus informally write Zu(φ(τ, σ)) = Zu(φ(τ[0,u), σ)) for every τ ∈ S
N and
u ∈ [t, T ]. In the continuous time framework, the latter property will underpin the definition of an
(Ŝ,H)-predictable mapping φ (see Section 3.5).
3 Arbitrage Bounds for a Combined Tranche
An important concept in multi-person game contingent claims is the ability to hold a collection of
tranchesN ⊆M. For example, a person holding tranches i and j simultaneously has possibly greater
payoff earning potential than two separate people holding tranches i and j without collusion. This is
due to the fact that the holder of tranches i and j may coordinate the strategies si and sj to improve
the combined payoff V i
ϑ(s)(s)+V
j
ϑ(s)(s). Consequently, the price of the combined tranche N = {i, j}
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is not necessarily equal to the sum of individual prices, even though from the practical perspective
this additivity property seems to be desirable. The issue of price additivity and consistent valuation
of all tranches will be further explored in Section 4.
In this section, we fix N and we restrict our attention to the pricing of a predetermined combined
tranche MGCNt (G, s) for some fixed t ∈ [0, T ] and a strategy profile s ∈ S. We address the following
problem, in which we implicitly work on the event of {ϑ(s) ≥ t} (since otherwise the question would
be meaningless anyway):
• Consider the game contingent claim MGC(G) and suppose that a strategy profile s[0,t) has
been played up to time t. At time t, a new holder purchases the tranche N from its previous
holder(s) for the price of piNt (G, s) and plans to hold it until the settlement time. What possible
values can piNt (G, s) take if neither issuer’s nor holder’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ) may occur?
3.1 Arbitrage Opportunities
We first define arbitrage opportunities from the perspective of a holder of a fixed combined tranche
N , as well as the issuer who is assumed to hold all remaining single tranches, that is, a combined
tranche −N . Recall the notation sN = (si, i ∈ N ) and V N
ϑ(s)(s) =
∑
i∈N V
i
ϑ(s)(s) for any subset
N ⊆ M. We stress that in the rest of this section, a date t, a combined tranche N and a strategy
profile s generating the history via h[0,t)(s) are fixed. Our goal in this section is to derive arbitrage
bounds at time t for a fixed combined tranche N . Nevertheless, the specification of payoffs for
tranches from the set −N will still matter, since decisions of the holder of −N may impact the
payoffs of tranches from N .
In the next definition, we fix t ∈ [0, T ] and we assume that the tranche N of the game contract
MGCt(G, s) is traded at time t at the price of pi
N
t (G, s). To alleviate notation, we will simply write
(B,S,N ) instead of a more precise notation (B,S, piNt (G, s)) if no confusion may arise.
Definition 3.1. A holder’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ) is a pair (φτ , τ) ∈ Φt(Hτ )×SNt (s) for which there
exists an event A ∈ Ft with a positive probability such that on A:
Zt(φ
τ (s)) < −piNt (G, s), Zϑ(s)(φ
τ (s)) ≥ −V Nϑ(s)(τ, σ), ∀σ ∈ S
−N
t (s).
An issuer’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ) is a pair (φσ, σ) ∈ Φt(Hσ) × S
−N
t (s) for which there exists an
event A ∈ Ft with a positive probability such that on A:
Zt(φ
σ(s)) < piNt (G, s), Zϑ(s)(φ
σ(s)) ≥ V Nϑ(s)(τ, σ), ∀ τ ∈ S
N
t (s).
We say that there is no arbitrage in (B,S,N ) if neither the issuer’s nor the holder’s arbitrage exists
in (B,S,N ).
Note that Definition 3.1 hinges on an implicit assumption that tranches are traded at time t
before actions at time t are chosen by all parties. In other words, only the history h[0,t) and the
σ-field Ft are observed by all parties before trading occurs at time t.
A holder’s arbitrage refers to a guaranteed profit for the buyer of the tranche N on [[t, ϑ(s)]]. The
price at time t should be high enough, so that a prospective holder should not be able to generate
profits without risk by combining the buy-and-hold strategy with some clever actions and a dynamic
portfolio composed of traded primary assets. Similarly, an issuer’s arbitrage refers to a guaranteed
profit for issuer of MGC(G) who sold the tranche N at time t and also holds the tranche −N until
time ϑ(s). From this perspective, the price should be low enough, so that it prevents the issuer from
making profit without risk even when he can make decisions regarding the tranche −N . When the
issuer does not hold the tranche −N , we may interpret an issuer’s arbitrage as a guaranteed loss
for the holder of the tranche N . It is rather clear that, under Definition 3.1, the valuation problem
for the tranche N can be formally reduced to a study of the two-person zero-sum game between the
holder of the tranche N and the issuer, who also holds −N .
I. Guo and M. Rutkowski 9
Arbitrages introduced in Definition 3.1 hinge on the enter-and-hold strategy, where the tranches
are kept from time t until the settlement time. Of course, alternative definitions of arbitrage oppor-
tunities are also possible. In Section 4, we will complement Definition 3.1 with additional conditions
that will ensure the existence and uniqueness of financially meaningful unique prices for all tranches.
3.2 Super-Hedging Strategies
For a European contingent claim, the terminal payoff can be frequently replicated by means of an
admissible portfolio. In the case of a game contingent claim, since it is not possible to anticipate
the action of other parties, replication is typically not possible. Instead, the parties involved may
attempt to super-hedge their positions. The definition of super-hedging trading strategies is very
similar to that for the two-person game option. As before, we consider the time t game contingent
claim MGCt(G, s). We focus on the holder of the tranche N and the issuer, who also holds the
tranche −N . Recall that we denote s = (τ, σ) and we place ourselves at time t ∈ [0, T ].
Definition 3.2. A holder’s super-hedging strategy is a pair (φτ , τ) ∈ Φt(Hτ )× SNt (s) such that
Zϑ(s)(φ
τ ) ≥ −V Nϑ(s)(τ, σ), ∀σ ∈ S
−N
t (s).
An issuer’s super-hedging strategy is a pair (φσ , σ) ∈ Φt(Hσ)× S
−N
t (s) such that
Zϑ(s)(φ
σ) ≥ V Nϑ(s)(τ, σ), ∀ τ ∈ S
N
t (s).
As expected, the super-hedging strategies are closely related to arbitrage bounds for prices of
tranches of game contingent claims.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the tranche N of the game contract MGCt(G, s) is traded at time t
at a price of piNt (G, s). If no issuer’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ) exists, then for any issuer’s super-hedging
strategy (φσ , σ) ∈ Φt(Hσ)× S
−N
t (s) we have that
Zt(φ
σ) ≥ piNt (G, s). (3.1)
If no holder’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ) exists, then for any holder’s super-hedging strategy (φτ , τ) ∈
Φt(Hτ )× SNt (s) we have that
Zt(φ
τ ) ≥ −piNt (G, s). (3.2)
Proof. Let us show that if the upper bound (3.1) is violated, then there exists an issuer’s arbitrage.
A similar argument can be used to check that the violation of the lower bound (3.2) leads to a
holder’s arbitrage. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume the upper bound of (3.1) is not
satisfied. On the event
{
piNt (G, s) > Zt(φ
σ)
}
, by the definition of an issuer’s super-hedging strategy,
we obtain
Zt(φ
σ) < piNt (G, s), Zϑ(s)(φ
σ) ≥ V Nϑ(s)(τ, σ), ∀ τ ∈ S
N
t (s).
Hence (φσ, σ) is an issuer’s arbitrage in (B,S,N ), which contradicts our assumption.
3.3 Hσ-Predictable Snell Envelopes
The notion of the Snell envelope, first introduced in [33], is an important tool for the valua-
tion of American and game options. For a given stochastic process Y , the Snell envelope U
is the smallest RCLL supermartingale dominating Y . At time t, the Snell envelope Ut equals
ess supτ∈T[t,T ] E(Yτ | Ft), so that it represents the essential supremum of Ft-conditional expectations
of Yτ over all choices of a stopping time τ ∈ T[t,T ].
A similar notion will be developed here in the context of a multi-person game claim MGC(G).
It will hinge on maximizing an expected value over the set of all possible strategies, rather than the
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set of all stopping times. Recall that the subset N ∈M is now fixed and we deal with a combined
tranche, specifically, a collection of single tranches i for all i ∈ N . Unless otherwise stated, we fix a
strategy profile s = (τ, σ) ∈ S where τ ∈ SN and σ ∈ S−N .
Recall that we work throughout under the unique martingale measure Q for a discrete-time (or
a continuous-time) market model, which is assumed to be complete and arbitrage-free in the usual
sense. Let V̂ϑ(s)(s) = B
−1
ϑ(s)Vϑ(s)(s) be the discounted payoff and let V̂
N
ϑ(s)(s) =
∑
i∈N V̂
i
ϑ(s)(s). In
the remainder of this work, we work under the following standing assumption.
Assumption 3.1. The discounted payoff satisfies the following integrability condition with respect
to Q, for every N ⊆M,
EQ
(
ess sup
s∈S
∣∣V̂ Nϑ(s)(s)∣∣) <∞.
3.3.1 Hσ-Predictable Snell Envelope of the First Kind
We first define the Hσ-predictable Snell envelope of the first kind, which is directly based on the
observations of decisions of the holder of the tranche N strictly before time t and the market data
up to time t. Note that the holder of −N has a priori the full knowledge of her fixed strategy σ on
[0, T ], but she only observes the outcome h[0,t)(τ, σ) at time t.
Definition 3.3. For a combined tranche MGCN (G) and a fixed σ ∈ S−N , the Hσ-predictable Snell
envelope of the first kind is the mapping Uσ :Hσ × [0, T ]× Ω→ R given by
Uσt (τ) = U
σ
t (h(τ, σ)) := ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Ft). (3.3)
Remark 3.1. Let us note that the definition of Uσt (τ) is not restricted to the event {ϑ(τ, σ) ≥ t}.
Indeed, on the event {ϑ(τ, σ) < t}, by convention, we may set
Uσt (τ) := V̂
N
ϑ(s)(τ, σ) ≤ U
σ
ϑ(s)(τ).
Recall that the class SNt (τ, σ) is defined by
SNt (τ, σ) =
{
τ ′ ∈ SN : h[0,t)(τ
′, σ) = h[0,t)(τ, σ)
}
. (3.4)
Since σ and τ are here fixed, the class SNt (τ, σ) only depends on h[0,t)(τ, σ). Therefore, the right-hand
side in (3.3) is indeed a well-defined mapping of the outcome h(τ, σ) ∈ Hσ, rather than the strategy
(τ, σ). Despite this, for the sake of brevity, we prefer to write Uσt (τ), rather than U
σ
t (h(τ, σ)).
The superscript σ in Uσ(τ) is used to emphasise that the strategies σ and τ play different roles
in Definition 3.3. Specifically, at any date t we assume to know an issuer’s strategy σ over [0, T ],
but we only assume that a holder’s strategy τ is observed on [0, t). This feature is formalised in the
next result, which shows that, intuitively, Uσt (τ) = U
σ
t (τ[0,t)) for all t ∈ [0, T ], where τ[0,t) is the
restriction of the holder’s strategy τ to the interval [0, t).
Lemma 3.1. The mapping Uσ is Hσ-predictable.
Proof. It is obvious from (3.3) that τ ∈ SN the random variable Uσt (τ) is Ft-measurable. For the
Hσ-predictability of Uσ, we need to show that, for all τ, τ ′ ∈ SN , the equality Uσ(τ) = Uσ(τ ′) holds
on [[0, ρ]] where (see (2.1))
ρ := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : ht(τ, σ) 6= ht(τ
′, σ)
}
∧ T. (3.5)
Recall that, by Assumption 2.3, the payoff mapping V N (and thus also the discounted payoff V̂ N )
is H-adapted (though not necessarily Hσ-predictable). For any t ∈ [0, T ], the event {t ≤ ρ} belongs
to Ft and the sets{
V̂ Nϑ(τ˜ ,σ)(τ˜ , σ)1{t≤ρ} : τ˜ ∈ S
N
t (τ, σ)
}
and
{
V̂ Nϑ(τ̂ ,σ)(τ̂ , σ)1{t≤ρ} : τ̂ ∈ S
N
t (τ
′, σ)
}
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are identical, due to the definition of SNt (τ, σ) and S
N
t (τ
′, σ) (see (3.4)). Consequently, the equality
Uσt (τ) = U
σ
t (τ
′) holds on {t ≤ ρ} for every t.
The Hσ-predictable Snell envelope Uσ has the following interpretation: suppose that the holder
of −N plays the strategy σ ∈ S−N on [0, T ] while the holder of N plays the strategy τ ∈ SN on
[0, t). Then Uσt (τ) is the maximal expected payoff, as seen at time t, which can be achieved by the
holder of N by varying his strategy on [t, T ]. It is thus natural to conjecture that the process Uσt (τ)
is a (Q,F)-supermartingale. The proof of the main result in this subsection, in which this conjecture
is validated (Proposition 3.2), requires several lemmas.
Lemma 3.2. Fix t ∈ [0, T ], N ⊂M and s ∈ S. Then the following set Dt has the lattice property
Dt :=
{
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Ft) : τ ′ ∈ SNt (τ, σ)}.
Proof. Let I be an arbitrary set and let Y := (Yi)i∈I be a family of random variables with
EQ(ess supi∈I |Yi|) < ∞. Then Y is said to have the lattice property if, for all i, j ∈ I, there
exist k, l ∈ I such that
Yk ≥ Yi ∨ Yj , Yl ≤ Yi ∧ Yj .
In our case, the set Dt may be represented as {Yτ ′ : τ ′ ∈ SNt (s)} where each Yτ ′ is Ft-measurable
and, in view of Assumption 3.1,
EQ( ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (s)
|Yτ ′ |) <∞.
We first show that it has the following property: for any event A ∈ Ft and arbitrary τ ′, τ ′′ ∈ SNt (s)
τ ′1A = τ
′′
1A =⇒ Yτ ′1A = Yτ ′′1A. (3.6)
In view of the H-adaptedness of the settlement time ϑ and the discounted payoff V̂ Nϑ(s)(τ, σ), the
equality τ ′1A = τ
′′
1A implies that
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)1A = V̂
N
ϑ(τ ′′,σ)(τ
′′, σ)1A.
Since 1A is Ft-measurable, we obtain Yτ ′1A = Yτ ′′1A, thus establishing (3.6). Let us now check the
lattice property of Dt. For arbitrary τ ′, τ ′′ ∈ SNt (s), we define the strategies τ1, τ2 by setting
τ1 = 1{Yτ′≥Yτ′′}τ
′ + 1{Yτ′<Yτ′′}τ
′′,
τ2 = 1{Yτ′≥Yτ′′}τ
′′ + 1{Yτ′<Yτ′′}τ
′.
Since the event {Yτ ′ ≥ Yτ ′} is Ft-measurable, it is clear that τ1, τ2 are F-adapted, H-predictable
mappings satisfying
h[0,t)(τ1, σ) = h[0,t)(τ2, σ) = h[0,t)(τ
′, σ) = h[0,t)(τ
′′, σ) = h[0,u)(s), ∀σ ∈ S
−N
t (s).
Hence τ1 and τ2 belong to SNt (s). Using condition (3.6), we also obtain Yτ1 = Yτ ′ ∨ Yτ ′′ and
Yτ2 = Yτ ′ ∧ Yτ ′′ . This establishes the lattice property of the set Dt.
The following result is a minor extension of Theorem A.32 in [9] (for the proof, see Lemma 7.18
in [10]).
Lemma 3.3. Let (Yi)i∈I be a family of Fu-measurable random variables with the lattice property
and such that E(ess sup i∈I |Yi|) <∞. Then the following statements are valid:
(i) there exist two sequences (in)n∈N, (jn)n∈N of indices such that the sequences (Yin)n∈N and (−Yjn)n∈N
are almost surely non-decreasing and
ess sup
i∈I
Yi = sup
n∈N
Yin = lim
n→∞
Yin , ess inf
j∈I
Yj = inf
n∈N
Yjn = lim
n→∞
Yjn ,
(ii) for any t ≤ u, we have
EQ
(
ess sup
i∈I
Yi
∣∣Ft) = ess sup
i∈I
E
(
Yi | Ft
)
, EQ
(
ess inf
j∈I
Yj
∣∣Ft) = ess inf
j∈I
E
(
Yj | Ft
)
.
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Lemma 3.4. (i) The following equality holds, for any t ≤ u,
EQ
(
Uσu (τ)
∣∣Ft) = ess sup
τ ′∈SNu (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Ft). (3.7)
(ii) For any τ ∈ SN , the process Uσ(τ) is uniformly integrable under Q.
Proof. (i) Let us consider t ≤ u. From Lemma 3.2, we deduce that, for fixed σ ∈ S−N and τ ∈ SN ,
the set
Du =
{
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Fu) : τ ′ ∈ SNu (τ, σ)} (3.8)
has the lattice property. Using part (ii) in Lemma 3.3 and the tower property of conditioning, we
thus obtain
EQ
(
Uσu (τ)
∣∣Ft) = EQ( ess sup
τ ′∈SNu (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Fu) ∣∣∣Ft) = ess sup
τ ′∈SNu (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Ft)
so that (3.7) is valid.
(ii) In view of Assumption 3.1, the process M given by Mt = EQ(MT | Ft), where
MT := ess sup
s∈S
∣∣V̂ Nϑ(s)(s)∣∣,
is a non-negative and uniformly integrable (Q,F)-martingale. Using the conditional Fatou lemma,
we obtain, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
∣∣Uσt (τ)∣∣ = ∣∣∣ ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Ft)∣∣∣ ≤ ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
|V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)|
∣∣Ft)
≤ EQ
(
ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (τ,σ)
∣∣V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ ′, σ)∣∣ ∣∣∣Ft) ≤ EQ( ess sup
s∈S
∣∣V̂ Nϑ(s)(s)∣∣ ∣∣∣Ft) =Mt.
Hence the process Uσ(τ) is uniformly integrable under Q.
Proposition 3.2. (i) For any τ ∈ SN , the process Uσ(τ) is a (Q,F)-supermartingale.
(ii) In the continuous-time case, if the process Uσ(τ) has an RCLL modification, then it is a (Q,F)-
supermartingale of class (D).
Proof. (i) It is clear that Uσ(τ) is an F-adapted process. The supermartingale property of Uσ(τ)
follows immediately from part (i) in Lemma 3.4 and the obvious inclusion SNu (τ, σ) ⊆ S
N
t (τ, σ) for
all t ≤ u, since
EQ
(
Uσu (τ)
∣∣Ft) = ess sup
τ ′∈SNu (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Ft)
≤ ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Ft) = Uσt (τ).
(ii) Recall that a process X is said to be of class (D) if it is RCLL and the family {Xρ : ρ ∈ T[0,T ]} of
random variables is uniformly integrable. We assumed that Uσ(τ) has an RCLL modification. Let
M be an RCLL version of the martingale M . Then |Uσρ (τ)
∣∣ ≤ Mρ for any stopping time ρ ∈ T[0,T ]
where the family {Mρ : ρ ∈ T[0,T ]} is uniformly integrable. Hence the family {U
σ
ρ (τ) : ρ ∈ T[0,T ]} is
uniformly integrable and thus Uσ(τ) is a supermartingale of class (D).
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3.3.2 Hσ-Adapted Snell Envelope
Definition 3.4 of the Hσ-adapted Snell envelope at time t hinges on the assumption that the decisions
of all parties at time t are already known. It other words, it is now assumed that, at time t, the
holder of −N observes the market data up to time t, as well as the outcome h[0,t](τ, σ). It is thus
rather clear that the Hσ-adapted Snell envelope is not directly suitable for super-hedging purposes.
However, it will serve as a crucial tool in the introduction of the Hσ-predictable Snell envelope of
the second kind in the continuous-time setup (see Section 3.5.2).
Definition 3.4. For a combined tranche MGCN (G) and a fixed σ ∈ S−N , we define the Hσ-adapted
Snell envelope U˜σ :Hσ × [0, T ]× Ω→ R by setting
U˜σ(τ) = U˜σt (h(τ, σ)) := ess sup
τ ′∈S˜Nt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Ft) (3.9)
where the subset S˜Nt (τ, σ) ⊆ S
N is given by
S˜Nt (τ, σ) :=
{
τ ′ ∈ SN : h[0,t](τ
′, σ) = h[0,t](τ, σ)
}
. (3.10)
Lemma 3.5. (i) The mapping U˜σ is Hσ-adapted.
(ii) Fix t ∈ [0, T ], N ⊂M and s ∈ S. Then the following set D˜t has the lattice property
D˜t :=
{
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Ft) : τ ′ ∈ S˜Nt (τ, σ)}.
Proof. The proof of part (i) (part (ii), resp.) is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.1 (Lemma 3.2,
resp.) and thus it is omitted.
Proposition 3.3. (i) The following equality holds, for any t ≤ u,
EQ
(
U˜σu (τ)
∣∣Ft) = ess sup
τ ′∈S˜Nu (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣Ft).
(ii) The process U˜σ(τ) is uniformly integrable under Q. In particular,
EQ
(
ess sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣U˜σt (τ)∣∣) <∞.
(iii) For any τ ∈ SN , the process U˜σ(τ) is a (Q,F)-supermartingale.
Proof. In view of Lemma 3.5, all statements can be established in a similar way as analogous
statements for the mapping Uσ(τ) (see the proofs of Lemma 3.4 and Proposition 3.2).
3.4 Discrete-Time Case
We now assume a discrete-time arbitrage-free and complete market model (B,S) with a finite un-
derlying probability space Ω. Therefore, for any European contingent claim with the payoff X at
its maturity date T , there exists a self-financing trading strategy φ satisfying, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Zt(φ) :=
d∑
i=0
φitS
i
t = EQ(XT | Ft).
Note that the portfolio φt is established at time t− 1, so that it is Ft−1-measurable, meaning that
the process φ is F-predictable, and φt may depend on the outcome h[0,t−1]. At time t, the portfolio
is revised from φt to φt+1 such that
d∑
i=0
φitS
i
t =
d∑
i=0
φit+1S
i
t ,
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φt+1 is Ft-measurable and it may depend on h[0,t]. Since the model is arbitrage-free, all trading
strategies that replicate X have the same wealth process. The uniqueness of a replicating strategy
is not guaranteed, however, since the complete market (B,S) may still have redundancies.
We return to the question posed in the beginning of the section, that is, for a given tranche N
we search for the possible prices of piNt (G, s) for some fixed t ∈ [0, T ] and s ∈ S that avoid arbitrage
in (B,S,N ). We will first focus on the discrete-time case, before proceeding to the continuous-time
one. Recall the convention [0, t) = [0, t− 1] := {0, . . . , t− 1} for every t = 1, 2, . . . , T . We denote by
Ẑ(φ) the discounted wealth given as Ẑ(φ) = B−1Z(φ). We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that a mapping M̂ :H× [0, T ]× Ω→ R satisfies the following properties:
(i) for any s ∈ S, the process M̂(s) = M̂(h(s)) is a (Q,F)-martingale,
(ii) M̂ is H-predictable.
Then there exists an H-predictable mapping φ such that, for every s ∈ S, the discounted wealth of a
trading strategy φ(s) satisfies Ẑ(φ(s)) = M̂(s).
Proof. For any s ∈ S, we simply define φ(s) as a replicating (hence necessarily admissible) trading
strategy for the claimBT M̂T (s). Hence the existence of φ(s) follows immediately from the postulated
completeness of the discrete-time market model (B,S) and Q-integrability of M̂T (s). It is also not
hard to show that an H-predictable version of the mapping φ can be selected (for details, see Section
7.2.2 in Guo [10]).
Remark 3.2. Note that the statement of the lemma will still hold if we replace H and [0, T ] by Hσ
and [t, T ], respectively.
The next result shows that, for any fixed (τ, σ) ∈ S and t ∈ [0, T ], there exists an issuer’s super-
hedging strategy (φσ, σ) on [t, T ] whose discounted wealth at time t coincides with the value Uσt (τ)
of the Hσ-predictable Snell envelope of the first kind. This property is a essential tool in establishing
the upper bound in Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 3.4. Take an arbitrary σ ∈ S−N and t ∈ [0, T ]. If a strategy τ ∈ SN is played by the
holder on [0, t − 1], then there exists a trading strategy φσ(τ) ∈ Φt(H
σ) such that (φσ(τ), σ) is an
issuer’s super-hedging strategy on [t, T ] and its discounted time t wealth is equal to the value Uσt (τ)
of the Hσ-predictable Snell envelope of the first kind. More explicitly, the discounted wealth process
Ẑu(φ
σ(τ)) := B−1u Zu(φ
σ(τ)), u ∈ [t, T ], satisfies, on the event {ϑ(τ, σ) ≥ t},
Ẑt(φ
σ(τ)) = Uσt (τ) (3.11)
and
Ẑϑ(τ,σ)(φ
σ(τ)) ≥ Uσϑ(τ,σ)(τ) ≥ V̂
N
ϑ(τ,σ)(τ, σ). (3.12)
Proof. We fix σ ∈ S−N and τ ∈ SN . Recall that the Snell envelope Uσ is Hσ-predictable and, by
Proposition 3.2, for any τ ∈ SN , the process Uσ(τ) is a (Q,F)-supermartingale. By applying the
Doob decomposition theorem, we obtain the unique decomposition Uσ(τ) = Mσ(τ) −Aσ(τ) where
Mσ(τ) is a (Q,F)-martingale and Aσ(τ) is an increasing, integrable, F-predictable process such that
Aσ0 (τ) = 0.
Let us take arbitrary τ, τ ′ ∈ SN and let us define the F-stopping time
ρ = ρ(τ, τ ′) := inf
{
u ∈ [0, T ] : hu(τ, σ) 6= hu(τ
′, σ)
}
∧ T. (3.13)
Since the mapping Uσ is Hσ-predictable the equality Uσ(τ) = Uσ(τ ′) holds on [[0, ρ]], meaning that
Uσ·∧ρ(τ) = U
σ
·∧ρ(τ
′). By the uniqueness of the Doob decomposition, we thus obtain
Mσ·∧ρ(τ) =M
σ
·∧ρ(τ
′), Aσ·∧ρ(τ) = A
σ
·∧ρ(τ
′), (3.14)
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For a fixed t, we define the process M̂σu (τ) :=M
σ
u (τ)−A
σ
t (τ), u ∈ [t, T ], which is a (Q,F)-martingale.
Then we deduce from (3.14) that M̂σ(τ) = M̂σ(τ ′) on [[t, ρ]]. We conclude that the mapping
M̂σ :Hσ × [t, T ]× Ω → R is Hσ-predictable and thus it satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 3.6 on
[t, T ] (see also Remark 3.2).
Let φσ ∈ Φt(Hσ) be the mapping given by Lemma 3.6 and Remark 3.2, for the mapping M̂σ.
To establish (3.11) and (3.12), we observe that, for all u ∈ [t, T ],
Ẑu(φ
σ(τ)) = M̂σu (τ) =M
σ
u (τ)−A
σ
t (τ) = U
σ
u (τ) +A
σ
u(τ) −A
σ
t (τ) ≥ U
σ
u (τ),
where the inequality becomes equality when u = t. This shows that all inequalities in (3.12) are
valid.
3.4.1 No-Arbitrage Bounds in Discrete Time
Proposition 3.4 has the following interpretation. Suppose that the issuer also holds the tranche −N
and chooses the strategy σ. Assume also we are at time t and the holder of the tranche N played a
strategy τ on [0, t− 1]. Then by implementing the Hσ-adapted trading strategy φσ(τ), the issuer is
super-hedging his position for all u ∈ [t, T ], so that the wealth Zu(φσ(τ)) of his portfolio will always
cover the required payoff for the holder of the tranche N , no matter how the holder of N will decide
to play on [t, T ]. By construction, φσ(τ) is also the cheapest (as of time t) of such super-hedging
trading strategies for a predetermined σ, and the discounted wealth at time t of the issuer’s portfolio
is equal to the value Uσt (τ) of the H
σ-predictable Snell envelope of the first kind.
By Proposition 3.1, an issuer’s arbitrage is precluded when the price of the tranche N is bounded
above by the value of any issuer’s super hedging strategy. This implies that Uσt (τ) is an upper bound
of the discounted arbitrage price at time t. In Theorem 3.1, we show that the best upper bound is
obtained by taking the infimum of Uσt (τ) over all possible choices of σ ∈ S
−N
t .
Theorem 3.1. Let us fix N ⊆ M and let us consider the tranche MGCNt (G, s). There is no
arbitrage in (B,S,N ) at time t if and only if the discounted price piNt (G, s) = B
−1
t pi
N
t (G, s) satisfies
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(s)(τ, σ)
∣∣Ft) ≤ piNt (G, s) ≤ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(s)(τ, σ)
∣∣Ft)
where Q is the unique martingale measure for the market model (B,S).
Proof. We will prove that the upper bound holds if and only if no issuer’s arbitrage exists. The
statement regarding the lower bound can be established by applying analogous arguments to the
game contingent claim MGC(G˜) with the payoffs defined by V˜ −N (τ, σ) = −V N (τ, σ). Note that the
upper bound can be rewritten as
piNt (G, s) ≤ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
Uσt (τ). (3.15)
First step. We first show that if there is no issuer’s arbitrage at time t then (3.15) holds. From
Proposition 3.4, we deduce that for any fixed σ ∈ S−N , there exists an issuer’s super-hedging strategy
(φσ(τ), σ) on [t, T ] with the discounted value at time t equal to Uσt (τ). Therefore, by Proposition
3.1, if no issuer’s arbitrage exists at time t, then piNt (G, s) ≤ U
σ
t (τ). The upper bound (3.15) follows,
as we may apply this argument to every σ ∈ S−Nt (s).
Second step. We will now show that if an issuer’s arbitrage exists at time t then (3.15) fails to hold.
Assume that (φσ, σ) is an issuer’s arbitrage, in the sense of Definition 3.1. Then there exists an
event A ∈ Ft with a positive probability P(A) (or, equivalently, Q(A)) such that, on the event A,
Ẑt(φ
σ) < piNt (G, s), Ẑϑ(s)(φ
σ) ≥ V̂ Nϑ(s)(τ, σ), ∀ τ ∈ S
N
t (s).
16 Multi-Person Game Contingent Claims
Since Ẑ(φσ) is a (Q,F)-martingale, from the optional sampling theorem we obtain, on the event A,
Ẑt(φ
σ) = EQ
(
Ẑϑ(s)(φ
σ)
∣∣Ft) ≥ EQ(V̂ Nϑ(s)(τ, σ) ∣∣Ft), ∀ τ ∈ SNt (s).
Hence, by the definition of the essential supremum, we obtain on A
piNt (G, s) > Ẑt(φ
σ) ≥ ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(s)(τ, σ)
∣∣Ft) = Uσt (τ) ≥ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
Uσt (τ).
Consequently,
Q
(
piNt (G, s) > ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
Uσt (τ)
)
> 0
and thus (3.15) fails to hold.
3.5 Continuous-Time Case
In this section, we consider an arbitrage-free and complete market model with the unique martingale
measure Q, for instance, the multi-dimensional Black-Scholes model (see Karatzas and Shreve [23]).
We emphasise that, in the continuous-time setup, the filtration F is assumed to satisfy the usual
conditions of Q-completeness and right-continuity. For i = 1, . . . , d, the discounted stock price
processes Ŝ1, . . . , Ŝd are (Q,F)-local martingales. Let us denote by L(Ŝ) the class of all Rd-valued,
F-predictable processes that are Ŝ-integrable on [0, T ]. More precisely, we identify any processes φ
and φ˜ from L(Ŝ) such that ∫
(0,t]
φu dŜu =
∫
(0,t]
φ˜u dŜu, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ],
and we write φ
Ŝ
= φ˜ in that case. Due to the local properties of the Itoˆ stochastic integral, for any
stopping time ρ ∈ T[0,T ] and any process φ ∈ L(Ŝ), if
∫
(0,·] φu dŜu = 0 on [[0, ρ]], meaning that∫
(0,t∧ρ]
φu dŜu = 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ],
then φ
Ŝ
= 0 on [[0, ρ]]. When searching for super-hedging strategies, we need to modify accordingly
Definition 2.2 of an H-predictable mapping.
Definition 3.5. A mapping φ :H × [0, T ]× Ω → Rd is (Ŝ,H)-predictable if φ(h) ∈ L(Ŝ) for every
h ∈ H and, for every h, h′ ∈ H, the equality φ(h)
Ŝ
= φ(h′) holds on [[0, ρ]] where ρ = ρ(h, h′) is given
by (2.1).
Throughout Section 3.5, we work under the following standing assumption, which complements
Assumption 3.1.
Assumption 3.2. The discounted stock price Ŝ = (Ŝ1, . . . , Ŝd) has the predictable representation
property with respect to the filtration F, that is, for any (Q,F)-martingale M there exists a process
φ ∈ L(Ŝ) such that M =
∫
(0,·]
φu dŜu.
3.5.1 Right-Continuous Games
Recall that theHσ-predictable Snell envelope Uσ(τ) is a (Q,F)-supermartingale for any fixed (τ, σ) ∈
S. To be able to apply the Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem, it suffices to show that Uσ(τ) is an
RCLL supermartingale of class (D). In view of part (ii) in Proposition 3.2, it thus remains to show
that Uσ(τ) admits an RCLL modification. To this end, we recall the classic Doob regularisation
theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 6.27 in Kallenberg [19]).
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Theorem 3.2. A (Q,F)-supermartingale U admits an RCLL modification if and only if the function
EQ(Ut), t ∈ [0, T ] is right-continuous.
By applying this result to our case, we see that the supermartingale Uσ(τ) has an RCLL modi-
fication whenever the expected value EQ(U
σ
t (τ)) is right-continuous. Note also that, from the proof
of part (i) in Lemma 3.4, we deduce that
EQ(U
σ
t (τ)) = sup
τ ′∈SNt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
)
. (3.16)
The right-continuity of the function given by (3.16) is not guaranteed, in general. Therefore, we
need to impose additional regularity conditions on the game G under the martingale measure Q. To
be more specific, in this subsection, we work under the following assumption.
Assumption 3.3. A continuous-time game G satisfies the following right-continuity condition: for
any N ⊆M and arbitrary s = (τ, σ) ∈ S−N ×SN , the following equalities hold for every t ∈ [0, T ],
lim
u↓t
sup
τ ′∈SNu (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
)
= sup
τ ′∈SNt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
)
, (3.17)
lim
u↓t
inf
σ′∈S−Nu (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ,σ′)(τ, σ
′)
)
= inf
σ′∈S−Nt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ,σ′)(τ, σ
′)
)
. (3.18)
Any game G satisfying Assumption 3.3 is referred to as a right-continuous game. The motivation
for this name stems from the fact that Assumption 3.3 allows us to establish the existence of an
RCLL modification of the Hσ-predictable Snell envelope of the first kind, as the following result
shows.
Corollary 3.1. Assume that a game G is right-continuous. Then, for any fixed (τ, σ) ∈ S, the
process Uσ(τ) has an RCLL modification which is a (Q,F)-supermartingale of class (D).
Proof. From Assumption 3.3, it follows that the function given by the right-hand side in (3.16) is
right-continuous. Hence the assertion is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.2 and Theo-
rem 3.2.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that the mapping M̂ :H× [0, T ]× Ω→ R satisfies the following properties:
(i) for any s ∈ S, the process M̂(s) = M̂(h(s)) is an RCLL (Q,F)-martingale,
(ii) M̂ is H-predictable.
Then there exists an (Ŝ,H)-predictable mapping φ such that, for every s ∈ S, the discounted wealth
of a trading strategy φ(s) satisfies Ẑ(φ(s)) = M̂(s). The statement is still valid if we replace H and
[0, T ] by Hσ and [t, T ], respectively.
Proof. For any fixed s ∈ S, by the postulated predictable representation property of Ŝ with respect
to F (see Assumption 3.2), there exists an F-predictable, Rd-valued, integrable process φ(s) such
that
M̂t(s) = M̂0(s) +
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
φju(s) dŜ
j
u, t ∈ [0, T ].
It is routine to check that φ(s) is indeed an admissible trading strategy with Ẑ(φ(s)) = M̂(s). For
any s, s′ ∈ S, we define the random time (see (2.1))
ρ(s, s′) := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : ht(s) 6= ht(s
′)
}
∧ T. (3.19)
Then ρ(s, s′) is an F-stopping time and, for every t ∈ [0, T ], the event {h[0,t)(s) = h[0,t)(s
′)} coincides
with {t ≤ ρ(s, s′)}. By the H-predictability of the mapping M̂ , the martingale M̂(s) − M̂(s′)
vanishes on [[0, ρ]], and thus, one again we conclude that φ(s)− φ(s′)
Ŝ
= 0 on [[0, ρ]]. This shows that
the mapping φ is (Ŝ,H)-predictable.
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The following proposition, which holds under Assumption 3.3, is the continuous-time analogue
of Proposition 3.4. We fix here t, and thus all mappings are considered on [t, T ], rather than [0, T ].
Proposition 3.5. Fix σ ∈ S−N and t ∈ [0, T ]. There exists a mapping φσ :Hσ × [t, T ] × Ω → R,
which is (Ŝ,Hσ)-predictable on [t, T ], such that for every τ ∈ SN , on the event {ϑ(τ, σ) ≥ t}, the
pair (φσ(τ), σ) is an issuer’s super-hedging strategy and its discounted wealth at time t is equal to
the value Uσt (τ) of the H
σ-predictable Snell envelope of the first kind, so that
Ẑt(φ
σ(τ)) = Uσt (τ) = ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣∣Ft), (3.20)
and
Ẑϑ(s)(φ
σ(τ)) ≥ Uσϑ(s)(τ) ≥ V̂
N
ϑ(s)(τ, σ). (3.21)
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.4. From Proposition 3.1, we know that,
for any τ ∈ SN , the Snell envelope Uσ(τ) is an RCLL Q-supermartingale of class (D). In view
of the Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem, there exists a continuous, uniformly integrable (Q,F)-
martingale Mσ(τ) and an increasing, F-predictable process Aσ(τ) satisfying Uσ(τ) = Mσ(τ) −
Aσ(τ), Aσ0 (τ) = 0 and this decomposition is unique. We define a candidate for the discounted
wealth process by setting M̂σu (τ) = M
σ
u (τ) − A
σ
t (τ) for all u ∈ [t, T ]. It clear that, for any fixed
τ ∈ SN , the process Ẑσ(τ) is a uniformly integrable (Q,F)-martingale.
We will show that the mapping M̂σ is Hσ-predictable on [t, T ]. To this end, we take arbitrary
s = (τ, σ), s′ = (τ ′, σ) and we define the F-stopping time ρ = ρ(τ, τ ′) using equation (3.13). Since
Uσ is Hσ-predictable, we have that Uσ(τ) = Uσ(τ ′) on [[0, ρ]]. From the uniqueness of the Doob-
Meyer decomposition, we thus obtain Mσ(τ) = Mσ(τ ′) and Aσ(τ) = Aσ(τ ′) on [[0, ρ]]. We deduce
easily that M̂σ(τ) = M̂σ(τ ′) on [[t, ρ]] and thus the Hσ-predictability of M̂σ on [t, T ] is established.
From Lemma 3.7, we deduce the existence of a mapping φσ :Hσ × [t, T ]×Ω→ R, which is (Ŝ,Hσ)-
predictable and such that the equality Ẑ(φσ(τ)) = M̂σ(τ) holds on [t, T ].
It now remains to check that (3.20) and (3.21) are valid. For any F-stopping time ϑ(s) taking
values in [t, T ], we obtain, on the event {ϑ(s) ≥ t},
Ẑϑ(s)(φ
σ(τ)) = M̂ϑ(s)(φ
σ(τ)) =Mσϑ(s)(τ) −A
σ
t (τ) = U
σ
ϑ(s)(τ) +A
σ
ϑ(s)(τ) −A
σ
t (τ) ≥ U
σ
ϑ(s)(τ)
with equality holding on the event {ϑ(s) = t}. This completes the proof of the theorem.
3.5.2 General Games
Assumption 3.3 is in fact too strong, since it is easy to produce examples of games for which it fails
to hold. Therefore, this assumption will be now relaxed, and we will show that a counterpart of
Corollary 3.1 can still be established (see Corollary 3.2). To this end, we will introduce an alternative
definition of the Hσ-predictable Snell envelope (see Definition 3.6), so that we need first to analyze
some basic relationships between the Snell envelopes Uσ and U˜σ. From Section 3.3, we already know
that the processes Uσ(τ) and U˜σ(τ) are (Q,F)-supermartingales, and thus their expected values are
decreasing functions of time.
Lemma 3.8. (i) For any τ ∈ SN and t < u, we have
Uσt (τ) ≥ U˜
σ
t (τ) ≥ EQ
(
Uσu (τ)
∣∣Ft) ≥ EQ(U˜σu (τ) ∣∣Ft). (3.22)
(ii) The following set bσ(τ) is countable
bσ(τ) :=
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : EQ(U
σ
t (τ)) > EQ(U˜
σ
t (τ))
}
.
(iii) If t /∈ bσ(τ), then Uσt (τ) = U˜
σ
t (τ).
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Proof. (i) The asserted inequalities follow from part (i) in Lemma 3.4 and the following obvious
inclusions S˜Nu (τ, σ) ⊆ S
N
u (τ, σ) ⊆ S˜
N
t (τ, σ) ⊆ S
N
t (τ, σ).
(ii) We start by noting that the inequality EQ(U
σ
t (τ)) ≥ EQ(U˜
σ
t (τ)) holds for all t. For any (τ, σ),
we define the set bσ(τ) of dates for which the inequality is strict. In view of (3.22), the decreasing
functions EQ(U
σ
t (τ)) and EQ(U˜
σ
t (τ)) have the same right-hand and left-hand limits for every t.
Therefore, they are equal at any t for which at least one of them (and thus both) are continuous.
To conclude the proof of part (ii), we observe that the set of points of discontinuity of a decreasing
function is countable.
(iii) We observe that if t /∈ bσ(τ) then EQ(Uσt (τ)) = EQ(U˜
σ
t (τ)). Hence the assertion is a direct
consequence of the inequality Uσt (τ) ≥ U˜
σ
t (τ) (see part (i)).
We define the mappings Bσ and B˜σ, which capture the cumulative differences between Uσ and
U˜σ, by setting, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and τ ∈ SN ,
Bσt (τ) :=
∑
u∈bσt (τ)
Uσu (τ) − U˜
σ
u (τ),
B˜σt (τ) :=
∑
u∈b˜σt (τ)
Uσu (τ) − U˜
σ
u (τ),
where we denote bσt (τ) = [0, t) ∩ b
σ(τ) and b˜σt (τ) = [0, t] ∩ b
σ(τ) and we apply the usual convention
that the empty sum equals zero. In view of part (iii) in Lemma 3.8, we have Bσt (τ) = B˜
σ
t (τ) for
every t /∈ bσ(τ).
Lemma 3.9. (i) The processes Bσ(τ) and B˜σ(τ) are non-negative and increasing.
(ii) The mapping Bσ (B˜σ, resp.) is Hσ-predictable (Hσ-adapted, resp.).
(iii) For any t ≤ u < v ≤ T , we have the inequality
EQ
(
B˜σv (τ) − B˜
σ
u(τ)
∣∣Ft) ≤ EQ(U˜σu (τ) − U˜σv (τ) ∣∣Ft).
Proof. (i) By part (ii) in Lemma 3.8, the set bσ(τ) is countable and thus the inequality Uσt (τ) ≥
U˜σt (τ) holds for all t ∈ b
σ(τ), with probability 1. Therefore, Bσ(τ) and B˜σ(τ) are non-negative
increasing processes.
(ii) To show that Bσ is Hσ-predictable, it suffices to check that Bσ(τ) = Bσ(τ ′) on [[0, ρ]] where
ρ = ρ(τ, τ ′) is given by (3.13). Since, by part (iii) in Lemma 3.8, equality Uσt (τ) = U˜
σ
t (τ) holds for
every t /∈ bσ(τ), we obtain
Bσt (τ) =
∑
u∈bσt (τ)∪b
σ
t (τ
′)
Uσu (τ) − U˜
σ
u (τ),
Bσt (τ
′) =
∑
u∈bσt (τ)∪b
σ
t (τ
′)
Uσu (τ
′)− U˜σu (τ
′).
Both sums are now over same countable index set, and thus the Hσ-predictability of Bσ follows from
the definition of bσt (τ) and b
σ
t (τ
′), since the Hσ-adaptedness of Uσ and U˜σ implies that Uσ(τ) =
Uσ(τ ′) and U˜σ(τ) = U˜σ(τ ′) on [[0, ρ)). The Hσ-adaptedness of B˜σ can be shown using similar
arguments.
(iii) From parts (i) and (ii) in Lemma 3.8, the following set of countable stochastic open intervals{(
EQ
(
U˜σw(τ)
∣∣Ft), EQ(Uσw(τ) ∣∣Ft)) : w ∈ (u, v] ∩ bσ(τ)}
consists of pairwise disjoint stochastic intervals lying within[
EQ
(
U˜σv (τ)
∣∣Ft), EQ(U˜σu (τ) ∣∣Ft)],
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almost surely. Consequently, the non-negative random variable B˜σv (τ) − B˜
σ
u (τ) satisfies
EQ
(
B˜σv (τ) − B˜
σ
u (τ)
∣∣Ft) = ∑
w∈(u,v]∩bσ(τ)
EQ
(
Uσw(τ)
∣∣Ft)− EQ(U˜σw(τ) ∣∣Ft)
≤ EQ
(
U˜σu (τ)− U˜
σ
v (τ)
∣∣Ft)
where the equality follows from Fubini’s theorem The inequality EQ
(
B˜σT (τ)
)
<∞ now follows, and
thus the process B˜σ(τ) is Q-integrable.
The following lemma establishes right-continuity conditions, which can be seen as an alternative
to Assumption 3.3.
Lemma 3.10. For every N ⊆ M and s = (τ, σ) ∈ S−N × SN , the following equalities hold for
every t ∈ [0, T ],
lim
u↓t
sup
τ ′∈S˜Nu (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
)
= sup
τ ′∈S˜Nt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
)
, (3.23)
lim
u↓t
inf
σ′∈S˜−Nu (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ,σ′)(τ, σ
′)
)
= inf
σ′∈S˜−Nt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ,σ′)(τ, σ
′)
)
. (3.24)
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to only prove the first equality. From part (i) in Proposition 3.3, we
have the equality
EQ
(
U˜σt (τ)
)
= sup
τ ′∈S˜Nt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
)
,
so that (3.23) is equivalent to the right-continuity of the function EQ
(
U˜σt (τ)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. Since for
t < w, we have S˜Nw (τ, σ) ⊆ S˜
N
t (τ, σ), and thus the function EQ
(
U˜σt (τ)
)
is decreasing. Hence the
right-hand limit limw↓t EQ
(
U˜σw(τ)
)
is well-defined and bounded above by EQ
(
U˜σt (τ)
)
.
Clearly, to establish equality (3.23), that is, the right-continuity of the function EQ
(
U˜σ(τ)
)
, it
is enough to show that EQ
(
U˜σt (τ)
)
≤ limw↓t EQ
(
U˜σw(τ)
)
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. For this purpose, we fix
τ˜ ∈ S˜Nt (τ, σ) and we consider the stopping time ρ given by
ρ := ρ(τ, τ˜ ) = inf
{
u ∈ [0, T ] : hu(τ, σ) 6= hu(σ, τ˜ )
}
∧ T.
Since τ˜ ∈ S˜Nt (τ, σ), we must have h[0,t](τ, σ) = h[0,t](τ˜ , σ) and thus ρ > t. Consider the process(
U˜σw(τ) − V˜
N
w (τ˜ , σ)
)
1{w<ρ}, for w ∈ (t, T ], where
V˜ Nw (τ˜ , σ) := EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ˜ ,σ)(τ˜ , σ)
∣∣∣Fw).
Assumption 2.1 and the finiteness of the sets of actions yield {w < ρ} = {h[0,w](τ, σ) = h[0,w](σ, τ˜ )}.
Consequently, we obtain
V˜ Nw (τ˜ , σ)1{w<ρ} ≤ ess sup
τ ′∈S˜Nw (τ,σ)
V˜ Nw (τ
′, σ)1{w<ρ} = U˜
σ
w(τ)1{w<ρ},
which in turn implies that (
U˜σw(τ) − V˜
N
w (τ˜ , σ)
)
1{w<ρ} ≥ 0. (3.25)
Observe that V˜ N (τ˜ , σ) is a (Q,F)-martingale and thus, by Theorem 3.2, it admits an RCLL mod-
ification. We also know that U˜σ(τ) is a (Q,F)-supermartingale (see part (iii) of Proposition 3.3),
but its right-continuity was not yet established. Doob’s regularization theorem (see, e.g., Theorem
6.27 in Kallenberg [19]) states that for any submartingale X on R+ with restriction Y on the set on
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positive rational numbers Q+, the process Y
+
t := limw↓t,w∈Q Yw is an RCLL process outside some
fixed Q-null set. By slightly modifying the proof of this theorem we may and do assume, without
loss of generality, that the countable set
I(τ, σ) :=
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : EQ(U
σ
t (τ)) > lim
w↓t
EQ(U˜
σ
w(τ))
}
,
is included in the countable, dense subset Q˜+ of R+. So we may define, for all t ∈ Q˜+,
U˜σt+(τ) := lim
w↓t,w∈Q˜+
U˜σw(τ).
One the one hand, the dominated convergence theorem (recall that we work under Assumption 3.1)
yields, for all t ∈ Q˜+,
lim
w↓t
EQ
(
U˜σw(τ)
)
= lim
w↓t,w∈Q˜+
EQ
(
U˜σw(τ)
)
= EQ
(
U˜σt+(τ)
)
. (3.26)
On the other hand, by applying the dominated convergence theorem to (3.25), we obtain
0 ≤ lim
w↓t,w∈Q˜+
EQ
((
U˜σw(τ) − V˜
N
w (τ˜ , σ)
)
1{w<ρ}
)
= EQ
(
U˜σt+(τ)− V˜
N
t (τ˜ , σ)
)
(3.27)
since the process 1{w<ρ}, w ∈ [t, T ], is bounded, with right-continuous sample paths, and 1{t<ρ} = 1.
By combining (3.26) with (3.27), we conclude that
lim
w↓t
EQ
(
U˜σw(τ)
)
= EQ
(
U˜σt+(τ)
)
≥ EQ
(
V˜ Nt (τ˜ , σ)
)
= EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ˜ ,σ)(τ˜ , σ)
)
. (3.28)
Since (3.28) holds for all τ˜ ∈ S˜Nt (τ, σ), we must have, for all t ∈ Q˜+,
lim
w↓t
EQ
(
U˜σw(τ)
)
≥ sup
τ ′∈S˜Nt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
)
= EQ
(
U˜σt (τ)
)
.
In view of the definition of the set I(τ, σ) ⊂ Q˜+, this completes the proof of the lemma.
Corollary 3.2. For any (τ, σ) ∈ S−N × SN , we have that
(i) the process U˜σ(τ) has an RCLL modification, which is a (Q,F)-supermartingale of class (D).
(ii) the process B˜σ(τ) has an RCLL modification, which is a (Q,F)-submartingale of class (D).
Proof. (i) In view of part (iii) in Proposition 3.3, the process U˜σ(τ) is a (Q,F)-supermartingale.
Moreover, by equality (3.23) in Lemma 3.10, its expected value EQ
(
U˜σt (τ)
)
is a right-continuous
function. The existence of an RCLL modification of U˜σ(τ) thus follows from Theorem 3.2. To show
that it is (Q,F)-supermartingale of class (D), we use part (iii) in Proposition 3.3 and we argue as is
the proof of part (ii) in Proposition 3.2.
(ii) To show that B˜σ(τ) has an RCLL modification, it suffices to check that the function EQ
(
B˜σt (τ)
)
is right-continuous or, more explicitly,
lim
u↓t
∑
v∈(t,u]∩bσ(τ)
EQ(U
σ
v (τ)) − EQ(U˜
σ
v (τ)) = 0.
Since the functions EQ
(
Uσt (τ)
)
≥ EQ
(
U˜σt (τ)
)
are decreasing and the equality EQ
(
Uσt (τ)
)
= EQ
(
U˜σt (τ)
)
holds for all t /∈ bσ(τ), we obtain
0 ≤
∑
v∈(t,u]∩bσ(τ)
EQ(U
σ
v (τ)) − EQ(U˜
σ
v (τ)) ≤ EQ(U˜
σ
t (τ)) − EQ(U˜
σ
u (τ)),
where the difference tends to 0 as u ↓ t since, from part (i), the function EQ
(
U˜σt (τ)
)
is right-
continuous.
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3.5.3 Hσ-Predictable Snell Envelope of the Second Kind
We are in a position to introduce another version of the concept of the Hσ-predictable Snell envelope,
which will serve as a convenient tool when searching for the issuer’s super-hedging strategy.
Definition 3.6. For a combined tranche MGCN (G) and a fixed σ ∈ S−N , the Hσ-predictable Snell
envelope of the second kind U¯σ :Hσ × [0, T ]× Ω→ R is given by
U¯σt (τ) := U˜
σ
t (τ) + B˜
σ
t (τ) = U
σ
t (τ) +B
σ
t (τ) (3.29)
where the second equality follows from part (iii) in Lemma 3.8.
Intuitively, the difference B˜σt (τ) = U¯
σ
t (τ)− U˜
σ
t (τ) represents the cumulative adjustments to the
process U˜σ(τ) that are needed to ensure that the inequality U¯σt (τ) ≥ U
σ
t (τ) holds for all t. It is fair
to say, however, that U¯σ(τ) does not enjoy as nice interpretation as Uσ(τ), so it should merely be
seen as a technical tool to derive the desired results, Propositions 3.6 and 3.7.
Proposition 3.6. For any σ ∈ S−N :
(i) the mapping U¯σ is an Hσ-predictable,
(ii) for any τ ∈ SN , the process U¯σ(τ) is an RCLL (Q,F)-supermartingale of class (D).
Proof. (i) It suffices to observe that the second equality in (3.29) yields U¯σ = Uσ + Bσ where Uσ
and Bσ are Hσ-predictable by Lemmas 3.1 and 3.9, respectively.
(iii) The first equality in (3.29) reads U¯σ(τ) = U˜σ(τ) + B˜σ(τ). Hence, from part (ii) in Lemma 3.9,
the process U¯σ(τ) is a (Q,F)-supermartingale. Next, from Corollary 3.2, it follows that U¯σ(τ) has
an RCLL modification and is of class (D).
We will now prove the existence of a super-hedging strategy on [t, T ]. It is worth noting that we
would like to employ here the following arguments, for any fixed t:
(i) the process U¯σu (τ), u ∈ [t, T ] is an RCLL (Q,F)-supermartingale of class (D),
(ii) we may and do assume, without loss of generality, that the equality U¯σt (τ) = U
σ
t (τ) holds, for
instance, by replacing the process B˜σ(τ) by B˜σ(τ)1[t,T ] in formula (3.29), that is, by neglecting the
past adjustments to U¯σ(τ) on [0, t).
Formally, in view of the second equality in (3.29), for a fixed t ∈ [0, T ], to make use of the above
features (i) and (ii), it is enough to define the auxiliary process Uˇσu (τ) = U¯
σ
u (τ) − Bt, u ∈ [t, T ],
which obviously satisfies Uˇσt (τ) = U
σ
t (τ) and is an RCLL (Q,F)-supermartingale of class (D).
Proposition 3.7. Fix σ ∈ S−N and t ∈ [0, T ]. There exists a mapping φσ :Hσ × [t, T ] × Ω → R,
which is (Ŝ,Hσ)-predictable on [t, T ], such that for every τ ∈ SN , on the event {ϑ(τ, σ) ≥ t}, the
pair (φσ(τ), σ) is an issuer’s super-hedging strategy and its discounted wealth at time t is equal to
the value U¯σt (τ) of the H
σ-predictable Snell envelope of the second kind, so that
Ẑt(φ
σ(τ)) = Uˇσt (τ) = U
σ
t (τ) = ess sup
τ ′∈SNt (τ,σ)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(τ ′,σ)(τ
′, σ)
∣∣∣Ft), (3.30)
and
Ẑϑ(s)(φ
σ(τ)) ≥ Uˇσϑ(s)(τ) ≥ U
σ
ϑ(s)(τ) ≥ V̂
N
ϑ(s)(τ, σ). (3.31)
Proof. The proof goes along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 3.5 with only minor modifi-
cations. We may now apply the Doob-Meyer decomposition Uˇσ(τ) = Mˇσ(τ) − Aˇσ(τ), to obtain an
Hσ-predictable martingale mapping M̂σu (τ), u ∈ [t, T ], which dominates U
σ(τ) on [t, T ], and which
will play the role of the wealth process of a super-hedging portfolio on [t, T ]. It is interesting to note
that we obtain the following decompositions for (Q,F)-supermartingales Uσ(τ) and U˜σ(τ)
Uσ(τ) = Mˇσ(τ) − Aˇσ(τ)−Bσ(τ), U˜σ(τ) = Mˇσ(τ) − Aˇσ(τ) − B˜σ(τ).
Recall that Uˇσt (τ) = U
σ
t (τ). We then proceed as in the proof of Proposition 3.5.
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3.5.4 No-Arbitrage Bounds in Continuous Time
The following theorem furnishes the no-arbitrage bounds for a price piNt (G, s) of a combined tranche
in the continuous-time framework. As expected, its conclusion is exactly the same as in discrete
time setup (see Theorem 3.1).
Theorem 3.3. Assume that a continuous time game G satisfies Assumption 3.1. Let us fix N ⊆M
and t ∈ [0, T ], and let us consider the tranche MGCNt (G, s). There is no arbitrage in (B,S,N ) if
and only if the discounted price piNt (G, s) = B
−1
t pi
N
t (G, s) at time t satisfies
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(s)(τ, σ)
∣∣∣Ft) ≤ piNt (G, s) ≤ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ(s)(τ, σ)
∣∣∣Ft). (3.32)
Proof. In view of Propositions 3.5 and 3.7, the arguments used in the proof of Theorem 3.3 are
exactly the same as the demonstration of Theorem 3.1 and thus we omit the details.
3.6 A Counter-Example
Unlike for two-person game options, the arbitrage-free condition of Definition 3.1 restricts the price
to an interval, rather than produces a single value. This is due to the fact that we are considering
a general game G with arbitrary payoff functions. It is difficult to make further progress without
being more specific about G, for instance, by restricting attention to zero-sum games. It is worth
stressing that in the non-zero case, even if the inequalities (3.32) are satisfied and arbitrage prices of
single tranches are uniquely defined, they may still be problematic from the financial point of view.
The following example illustrates this statement.
Example 3.1. This example is based on the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Specifically, let G be a
deterministic game with two players, each having the action space of Si = {0, 1} for i = 1, 2. The
payoff function is given by
V (τ, σ) τ = 0 τ = 1
σ = 0 (1, 1) (−1, 2)
σ = 1 (2,−1) (0, 0)
Note that there is an optimal equilibrium at (τ∗, σ∗) = (1, 1) and thus the unique value is (0, 0).
Consider the contract MGC(G) in a market model with null interest rate. It is easy to see that for
each individual tranches, the upper and lower prices are both $0. Hence the arbitrage price for each
tranche must be pi1(G) = pi2(G) = 0. But when we consider the collection of tranches M = {1, 2},
the unique arbitrage price is
piM(G) = ess sup
s∈S
(
V 1(s) + V 2(s)
)
= V 1(1, 1) + V 2(1, 1) = 2. (3.33)
In particular, note that pi1(G) + pi2(G) 6= piM(G).
Now interpret this from the perspective of the issuer and the two prospective holders who are
about to enter the contract MGC(G). For the issuer, the total selling price for the two tranches
cannot be less than $2, since there is nothing stopping the two holders from working together for a
combined payoff of $2. For the prospective holders of the tranche 1, the buying price cannot be more
than $0, since there is nothing stopping the holder of the tranche 2 from playing 1, and limiting the
payoff of the tranche 1 to at most 0. In fact, it is strictly better for the holder of the tranche 2 to
play 1 than 0 in all cases. A similar analysis can be made for the prospective holder of the tranche 2.
So it is impossible for any deal to strike between the three parties. The issuer will always be
demanding more than what the prospective holders are willing to pay. The only way to resolve this
situation is for at least two of the three parties to agree to work together and share their payoffs in
some way. For example, the two holders agree to buy the two tranches for $2 and play (0, 0); or the
issuer agrees to sell the tranches for $0, but requiring one of the holders to play 1.
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3.7 No-Arbitrage Versus Super-Hedging
We have shown in Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 that there is no arbitrage in the market (B,S,N ) if and
only if the discounted price of the tranche MGCNt (G, s) satisfies
piNt (G, s) ≤ pi
N
t (G, s) ≤ pi
N
t (G, s) (3.34)
where the upper price piNt (G, s) and the lower price pi
N
t (G, s) are defined by
piNt (G, s) := ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σ),
piNt (G, s) := ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σ),
where
V̂ Nt (τ, σ) := EQ
(
V̂ Nϑ (τ, σ)
∣∣Ft).
In Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, the upper and lower prices were derived using arbitrage pricing arguments.
As expected, they also have an interpretation in terms of super-hedging strategies introduced in
Definition 3.2. To this end, we will need the following property.
Lemma 3.11. There exist two sequences of strategies, (τn)n∈N from SNt (s) and (σn)n∈N from
S−Nt (s), such that the sequences(
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σn)
)
n∈N
and
(
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (τn, σ)
)
n∈N
are almost surely non-increasing and non-decreasing, respectively. Furthermore, they converge to the
upper and lower prices, specifically,
lim
n→∞
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σn) = inf
n∈N
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σn) = pi
N
t (G, s),
and
lim
n→∞
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (τn, σ) = sup
n∈N
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (τn, σ) = pi
N
t (G, s).
Proof. Using arguments identical to Lemma 3.2, the sets{
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σ) : σ ∈ S
−N
t (s)
}
,
{
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σ) : τ ∈ S
N
t (s)
}
(3.35)
have the lattice property. Hence the existence of the desired sequences follows by part (i) in
Lemma 3.3.
Suppose the issuer holds the tranche −N and plays the strategy σ ∈ S−Nt (s) while super-hedging
using (φσ , σ). The upper price piNt (G, s) is the infimum of Ẑt(φ
σ) (the discounted time t value)
over all possible σ ∈ S−Nt (s). Even though the infimum is not necessarily achieved, Lemma 3.11
shows that there exists a sequence of (σn)n∈N such that Ẑt(φ
σn) is non-increasing and converging
to piNt (G, s). Intuitively, the buyer of the tranche N will be reluctant to pay more than pi
N
t (G, s)
at time t. Otherwise, his expected discounted payoff could be restricted to be lower than the price
paid and, as shown by Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, leads to an issuer’s arbitrage.
Similarly, the holder of the trancheN plays the strategy τ ∈ SNt (s) and super-hedges the negative
of his payoff using (φτ , τ). The lower price piNt (G, s) is the supremum of −Ẑt(φ
τ ) over all possible
τ ∈ SNt (s). Again the supremum is not necessarily achieved, but Lemma 3.11 shows that there exists
a sequence of (τn)n∈N such that −Ẑt(φσn) is non-decreasing and converges to piNt (G, s). Intuitively,
it is undesirable for the issuer to sell the tranche N for a price cheaper than piNt (G, s). Otherwise
the holder of the tranche N will be able to guarantee an expected discounted payoff greater than
the price. As shown in Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, this leads to a holder’s arbitrage.
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4 Pricing of Multi-Person Game Claims
In the previous section, we focussed on arbitrage valuation of a fixed combined tranche N of
MGCNt (G, s). In Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, we have shown that, in the absence of arbitrage in the
market model (B,S,N ) (see Definition 3.1), an arbitrage price at time t of a combined tranche N
lies between the upper and lower prices, that is, (3.34) holds. If there is no arbitrage in (B,S,N )
for any non-empty subset of tranches N ⊆ M, then (3.34) actually describes a total of 2(2m − 1)
inequalities, which are not easy to handle, in general. In this section, we shall further explore how
the prices of different collections of tranches are related to one another. In particular, we address in
this section the following questions:
• Apart from (3.34), should there be other constraints on prices of tranches?
• Should the price of a combined tranche be equal to the sum of prices of all single tranches,
which constitute a combined tranche?
• Under which assumptions, a consistent valuation of all tranches (hence of a multi-person game
claim) is feasible?
4.1 Super-Additivity of Lower Prices
We first show that the lower prices piNt (G, s) are inherently super-additive.
Proposition 4.1. The lower price of MGCNt (G, s), which is defined by
piNt (G, s) = ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σ),
has the following super-additive property: if N1,N2, . . . ,Nk is a partition of N , then
piNt (G, s) ≥
k∑
i=1
piNit (G, s).
Proof. According to Lemma 3.11, for each of the sets Ni, we may choose a sequence (τNin )n∈N from
SNit (s) such that the sequence
ess inf
σ−Ni∈S
−Ni
t (s)
V̂ Nit
(
τNin , σ
−Ni
)
, n ∈ N
is non-decreasing and converges to piNit (G, s). Now define the strategy τn ∈ S
N
t (s) for n ∈ N by
τn := (τ
N1
n , . . . , τ
Nk
n ). For each i = 1, . . . , k and for all σ ∈ S
−N
t (s), we have
V̂ Nt (τn, σ) =
k∑
i=1
V̂ Nit (τn, σ) ≥
k∑
i=1
ess inf
σ−Ni∈S
−Ni
t (s)
V̂ Nit
(
τNin , σ
−Ni
)
.
Since this holds for all σ ∈ S−Nt (s), the above inequality implies that
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (τn, σ) ≥
k∑
i=1
ess inf
σ−Ni∈S
−Ni
t (s)
V̂ Nit
(
τNin , σ
−Ni
)
and thus
piNt (G, s) = ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σ) ≥ sup
n∈N
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (τn, σ)
≥ sup
n∈N
k∑
i=1
ess inf
σ−Ni∈S
−Ni
t (s)
V̂ Nit
(
τNin , σ
−Ni
)
=
k∑
i=1
piNit (G, s),
which completes the proof.
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The super-additive property from Proposition 4.1 can be easily explained as follows. First note
that, by Lemma 3.11, the holder of any individual tranche may choose a strategy to guarantee an
expected discounted payoff which is arbitrarily close to its lower price. So by playing these strategies
over a collection of tranches, one can guarantee a total expected discounted payoff arbitrarily close
to the sum of individual lower prices, which is in turn no greater than the lower price of the collection
of tranches.
Unfortunately, no analogous additive properties exist for the upper prices piNt (G, s). Furthermore,
from the analysis so far, there is no reason for the prices piNt (G, s) themselves to satisfy any additive
properties either. Does that mean the bounds described by (3.34) are the only important constraints
when pricing game contingent claims?
4.2 Additivity of Prices
As illustrated by Example 3.1, even if the bounds of (3.34) hold (and thus the no-arbitrage property
of Definition 3.1 is satisfied), they do not necessarily lead to sensible pricing of the contract. There
are two main causes of this discrepancy. First, each party simply cannot rule out the possibilities of
the others colluding. This perceived possibility of collusion can also be interpreted as the uncertainty
over the identity of the other holders, that is, multiple holders (or issuer) may actually be the same
person. Second, the arbitrage prices in Example 3.1 do not satisfy a natural requirement of price
additivity.
Definition 4.1. We say that the price additivity holds whenever
piNt (G, s) =
∑
k∈N
pikt (G, s), ∀N ⊆M.
In general, the problem highlighted by Example 3.1 occurs under the following conditions. Sup-
pose there are k prospective buyers, who intend to purchase tranches N1, . . . ,Nk, respectively, while
the issuer decides to keep the tranche −N = −(N1∪· · ·∪Nk). It is not possible to reach agreements
on prices if the lower price of the tranche N exceeds the sum of upper prices of the tranche Ni,
k∑
i=1
piNit (G, s) < pi
N
t (G, s) =⇒
k∑
i=1
piNit (G, s) < pi
N
t (G, s). (4.1)
Indeed, the issuer will then always demand more than the what the holders are willing to pay.
However, if the price additivity holds, then strict inequality (4.1) cannot occur.
Example 3.1 offered some justification to why the additivity of prices is a desirable condition.
To further consolidate this belief, we shall introduce a second form of arbitrage called immediate
reselling arbitrage. In the previous section, Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 prevent enter-and-hold arbitrage
opportunities (as per Definition 3.1), which are executed by holding a fixed collection of tranches
from time t until the settlement time. An immediate reselling arbitrage simply involves buying some
tranches at time t and then instantly reselling them in a different configuration with the goal of
collecting a higher total price. We will define this formally.
Definition 4.2. Consider the game contingent claim MGCt(G, s) at time t. For each N ⊆ M,
denote the price of the tranche N by piNt (G, s). A immediate reselling arbitrage consists of two
different partitions of some subset N ⊆M,
N = N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nk = N
′
1 ∪ · · · ∪ N
′
l ,
such that the inequality
k∑
i=1
piNit (G, s) <
l∑
j=1
pi
N ′j
t (G, s)
holds on some Ft-measurable event A with a positive probability.
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In European and American option pricing models, immediate reselling arbitrages are implicitly
avoided due to the law of one price. In multi-person game contingent claims, the ability to purchase
collections of tranches has reintroduced this possibility. However, it is easy to see that immediate
reselling arbitrages are avoided whenever the price additivity holds. The following result is an
immediate consequence of Definition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2. There is no immediate reselling arbitrage if and only if the additivity of prices
holds. In other words,
piNt (G, s) =
∑
k∈N
pikt (G, s), ∀N ⊆M.
By combining Proposition 4.2 with Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, we obtain the following characterisation
of prices which avoids both types of arbitrage mentioned. As usual, we consider a multi-person
stochastic game whose payoffs satisfy the appropriate conditions (Assumption 3.1 for the discrete-
time set-up and Assumption 3.1 for the continuous-time set-up).
Theorem 4.1. For every N ⊆ M, let piNt (G, s) be the discounted time t price of the combined
tranche N in MGCNt (G, s). Then there is no arbitrage in (B,S,N ) for all N ⊆M and no immediate
reselling arbitrage if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) the equality
piNt (G, s) =
∑
k∈N
pikt (G, s)
holds for all N ⊆M,
(ii) the random vector (pi1t (G, s), . . . , pi
m
t (G, s)) lies in the following random subset of R
m,{
(X1, . . . , Xm) : ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σ) ≤
∑
i∈N
Xi (4.2)
≤ ess inf
σ∈S−Nt (s)
ess sup
τ∈SNt (s)
V̂ Nt (τ, σ), ∀N ⊆M
}
,
where X1, . . . , Xm are Ft-measurable random variables.
Remark 4.1. In some game contingent claims MGC(G), such as Example 3.1, the conditions of
Theorem 4.1 cannot be satisfied because the set in (4.2) is empty. This means that some game
contingent claims MGC(G) simply do not admit prices under our arbitrage-free assumptions. Occa-
sionally this may be remedied if the identities of the holders (or the possibility of collusion) is known
to everyone in advance, but in these cases MGC(G) is equivalent to a (simpler) contract with less
tranches. Another solution is to alter the definitions of arbitrage and weaken some of the pricing
bounds. In any case, it is fair to admit that condition (4.2) is not handy and thus we will present
more explicit conditions in Theorem 4.2 below.
4.3 Optimal Equilibrium and Arbitrage Prices
From a purely game-theoretic perspective, the upper and lower prices are also the minimax and
maximin values of the coalition N in the subgame of G on [t, T ]. Note that the expected discounted
payoff under the martingale measure Q is used in this case. As shown in Section 3.7, the properties
of minimax and maximin strategies may be interpreted using super-hedging arguments.
In general, the infimum in the upper price and the supremum in the lower price are not nec-
essarily achieved. But if G is known to have an optimal equilibrium s∗ then, from Corollary 5.1,
the maximin and minimax values for each player (or equivalently, the lower and upper prices of
individual tranches) are achieved by V̂t(s
∗), i.e., by the unique value of the game. Consequently, the
vector of prices of individual tranches must coincide with the unique value of the game.
As demonstrated by means of Example 3.1, the mere existence of optimal equilibria still does
not lead to additive prices. However, Proposition 5.3 in the appendix shows that if the game G is
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also known to satisfy some further conditions (e.g., zero-sum), then coalition values exist and satisfy
the additivity property. In that case, the prices of combined tranches are also unique and the price
additivity holds.
We summarise these results in the following theorem. Note that the date t ∈ [0, T ) is fixed, but
arbitrary. We work under our standing assumptions, that is, Assumption 3.1 for the discrete-time
case and Assumption 3.1 for the continuous-time case.
Theorem 4.2. Consider a game G and the associated game contingent claim MGC(G). Assume
that the strategy profile s[0,t) ∈ S[0,t) is chosen before time t and ϑ(s) ≥ t. Let the expected discounted
payoff under the unique martingale measure Q be denoted by V̂t(τ, σ) = EQ
(
V̂ϑ(τ, σ)
∣∣Ft).
Suppose that the subgame on the time interval [t, T ] has an optimal equilibrium s∗ = (τ∗, σ∗) ∈
St(s), meaning that
V̂ kt (τ
∗, σ∗) = ess inf
σ∈S−kt (s)
V̂ kt (τ
∗, σ) = ess sup
τ∈Skt (s)
V̂ kt (τ, σ
∗), ∀ k ∈M. (4.3)
(i) Then, for any k ∈M, there is no arbitrage in (B,S, k) if and only if the discounted time t price
of a single tranche k satisfies
pikt (G, s) = V̂
k
t (s
∗).
(ii) Assume, in addition, that the optimal equilibrium s∗ satisfies the following condition∑
k∈M
V̂ kt (s
∗) = ess sup
s′∈St(s)
∑
k∈M
V̂ kt (s
′). (4.4)
Then, for any N ∈ M, there is no arbitrage in (B,S,N ) if and only if the discounted time t price
of a combined tranche N has the following additivity property
piNt (G, s) =
∑
k∈N
V̂ kt (s
∗) = V̂ Nt (s
∗). (4.5)
Furthermore, there is no immediate reselling arbitrage if and only if (4.5) is satisfied for all N ⊆M.
Proof. (i) Corollary 5.1 from the appendix shows that all optimal equilibria achieve the minimax and
maximin values simultaneously. Since we know from Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 that an arbitrage price
must lie between the upper and lower prices, which are identical to the minimax and maximin values,
an arbitrage price must in fact coincide with the unique value achieved by any optimal equilibrium.
(ii) Proposition 5.3 from the appendix states that, under (4.4), the coalition values exist and enjoy
the additivity property. Formula (4.5) thus follows immediately from Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, since
the arbitrage price of a combined tranche must coincide with the coalition value. The lack of the
immediate reselling arbitrage is a consequence of Proposition 4.2 and the price additivity.
4.4 Classes of Solvable Multi-Person Games
Part (ii) in Theorem 4.2 is of great significance, since it further justifies the choice of the optimal
equilibrium as a solution concept when studying multi-person game contingent claims, as it produces
unique arbitrage prices for individual tranches. In general, as shown in Section 3.6, this would not
be possible to achieve with weaker solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium.
Let us thus focus on multi-player games that admit an optimal equilibrium under the unique
martingale measure Q. In this situation, the existence of unique and additive arbitrage prices for
single tranches of a multi-person game claim hinges on condition (4.4). Hence the following natural
problem arises: describe sufficiently large classes of multi-player games, which admit an optimal
equilibrium and satisfy condition (4.4).
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This issue is of interest even in the case of two-person non-zero-sum Dynkin games, although it is
fair to say that in most existing papers devoted to Dynkin games, the authors focus on the existence
of a Nash equilibrium (see, for instance, Hamade`ne and Hassani [14, 15], Hamade`ne and Zhang
[16], Laraki and Solan [28], Peskir [32] or Ohtsubo [30]). In particular, in [16], the authors examine
indifference pricing of financial contracts, which are based on non-zero-sum Dynkin games. This
should be contrasted with the case of a zero-sum Dynkin game, for which the arbitrage valuation
theory can be applied in a relatively straightforward manner, as demonstrated by Kifer [24] (for
related results in this vein, see also [6, 7, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27]).
For the multi-player case with m ≥ 3, an explicit specification of a sensible game admitting
an optimal equilibrium is a challenging issue, which was studied in some recent works (see [12,
13, 29]). Due to limited space, we do not discuss this issue in detail here, and we instead restrict
ourselves to providing some examples of multi-person games with an optimal equilibrium satisfying
condition (4.4). In particular, in Section 4.5, we solve a particular valuation problem for a multi-
person contract with puttable tranches, which was described in Section 1.1.
As a first example of a game admitting an optimal equilibrium, we may quote any two-player
zero-sum game in which only one player has meaningful decisions to make or, equivalently, any single
player game. In fact, this class of relatively simple stochastic games covers most of conventional
financial derivatives in which the ‘issuer’ has no right to make any decisions about a sold contract.
Obviously, we have in mind here plain-vanilla American options, for which the valuation hinges
on solving an optimal stopping problems, but also more complex derivatives of an American style
with some ‘exotic’ features, which may allow the holder to make other relevant decisions, not only
exercising (e.g., an American chooser option). Original examples of more sophisticated multi-player
games satisfying the assumptions of part (ii) in Theorem 4.2 are collected in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that a game G belongs to either of the following classes of multi-player
games:
(i) zero-sum (or constant-sum) games that admits an optimal equilibrium,
(ii) multi-period redistribution games, denoted as MRG(X,α),
(iii) affine stopping games, denoted as ASG(X,G), with a K†-matrix G with non-negative column
sums.
Then G has an optimal equilibrium satisfying condition (4.4)
Proof. (i) This part is rather obvious, since both sides in (4.4) vanish identically (or are equal to
the same constant) for a zero-sum (or a constant-sum) game.
(ii) Multi-period redistribution games MRG(X,α) are studied in [12], where it was shown that
these zero-sum (non-zero-sum, resp.) redistribution games have an optimal equilibrium by virtue of
Theorem 2 (Theorem 3, resp.).
(iii) Recall that K†-matrix is a square matrix with a non-negative determinant, positive proper
principal minors, and with non-positive off-diagonal terms (see Definition 3.2 in [13]). The desired
properties of an affine stopping game ASG(X,G) with a K†-matrix G were established in Theorem
3.2 in [13].
In the same way a general game contingent claim is defined, one can define a multi-person game
contingent claim based on a multi-player game G. Of course, a classic example of this approach is
the definition of the two-person game claim, which corresponds to a zero-sum two-person Dynkin
game. It should be mentioned, however, that in a multi-period (or continuous-time) setup, the
redistribution and affine games introduced in Guo [10] and Guo and Rutkowski [11, 12, 13] are
defined recursively, meaning that the payoffs at settlement depend on the value of analogous virtual
game continued after the settlement date (this concept is reminiscent of a continuation value for an
American or game claim). For this reason, the optimal equilibria are obtained either through the
backward induction or by solving a multi-dimensional reflected BSDE (see Nie and Rutkowski [29]).
The latter approach hinges on a multi-dimensional extension of the one-dimensional doubly-reflected
BSDE for the Dynkin game studied in Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [5].
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4.5 Pricing of Multi-Person Contracts with Puttable Tranches
We conclude this work by examining arbitrage pricing of a multi-person contract with puttable
tranches. Recall that the mechanism of this contract was outlined in Section 1.1. The key idea is
to reduce the valuation problem into the search of optimal equilibria for the associated multi-player
stochastic game under a unique martingale measure for the underlying market model. We then
apply the results from our previous papers [11, 12] to find the solution to the game. In fact, the
results from [12] need to be slightly extended, since the redistribution games studied in [12] are
formally postulated to terminate as soon as at least one of the players decides to exercise (i.e., stop
the game), whereas in Section 1.1 we introduced a contract, which always continues till its maturity
date T = Tn+1. Note that we work here with either a discrete- or continuous-time setting.
Let us consider the date Tn. Suppose that there exists a unique martingale measure Q for the
underlying market model, say, the CRR binomial model or the Black and Scholes model. We assume,
for simplicity, that the interest rate is null (otherwise, one would work with the discounted values).
Then the prices P 1n , . . . , P
m
n of tranches at time Tn, before decisions of all parties at time Tn were
made (dubbed the continuation values at time Tn), are prices of European or American options and
thus they can be found by the usual arbitrage pricing method independently for each tranche. For
instance, if the terminal payoffs of European contingent claims are X1n+1, . . . , X
m
n+1, then we obtain
the equality P in = EQ(X
i
n+1 | FTn) for every i where F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is the underlying filtration.
A strategy for the holder of tranche i on [0, Tn] is denoted by s
i. In the present setting, it consists
of choosing between ‘hold’ or ‘put’ at each date T1, . . . , Tn. These decisions are made by the current
holder of tranche i as time progresses, which may not be the same person, due to the nature of the
contract. Let us denote a generic strategy profile by s and its restriction to [Tl, Tn] by sl. It will
be convenient to represent a strategy profile sl as sl = (τl, σl) where τl = s
i
l (σl = s
−i
l , resp.) is the
strategy of player i (the strategy profile for all other players, resp.) on [Tl, Tn]. We denote by El(sl)
the set of players who decide to put the tranche at time Tl when a strategy profile sl is played on
[Tl, Tn]. To proceed further, we need to introduce some notation, which is adapted from [12]. For
any X = (X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ Rm and an arbitrary subset E ⊆ M, we define the hyperplane
H(E , X, c) :=
{
x ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
xi = c and xi = X
i, ∀ i ∈ E
}
and the simplex
S(X, c) :=
{
x ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
xi = c and xi ≥ X
i, ∀ i ∈M
}
.
Let an FTl-measurable random variable (C
1
l , . . . , C
m
l ) and an FTl-measurable subset El of M be
given. Then we define the random, FTl-measurable hyperplane H(El, Xl, cl) and the random FTl-
measurable simplex S(Xl, cl), where cl :=
∑m
i=1 C
i
l . Let us finally observe that, since for the uniform
redistribution we have that αi =
1
m
for all i, the inner product given by equation (3.9) in [12] reduces
to the Euclidean inner product and thus the projection pi0 utilised in Theorem 3.12 in [12] is the
usual orthogonal projection in Rm; it will be henceforth denoted as pi. The next definition hinges on
Lemma 3.11 in [12], which furnishes an explicit characterisation (4.6) of the effective (or modified)
payoff in a zero-sum single-period redistribution game. We denote by V ∗t+1 the value of the subgame
started at Tt+1 and thus the definition of the game is recursive (its correctness is formally supported
by Proposition 4.4 where the existence and uniqueness of the value process is established).
Definition 4.3. Assume that an F-adapted process Xl = (X
1
l , . . . , X
m
l ), l = 1, . . . , n and the
continuation value Pn = (P
1
n , . . . , P
m
n ) at time Tn are given. Let V
i
l (sl) denote the FTl-conditional
expected risk-neutral payoff at time Tl for the current holder of tranche i given that a strategy profile
sl is played on [Tl, Tn]. In the multi-player game with puttable tranches, for any strategy profile s,
Vl(sl) is defined recursively through the following expression, for every l = 1, . . . , n and i = 1, . . . ,m,
V il (sl) := X
i
l1{ϑi(sl)=l} +
([
piH(El(sl),Xl,pl)(Pl)
]i
− P il + EQ
(
V il+1(sl+1) | FTl
))
1{ϑi(sl)>l} (4.6)
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where the equality ϑi(sl) = l (the inequality ϑ
i(sl) > l, resp.) means that the holder of the ith
tranche decides to put (decides not to put, resp.) at time Tl and
pl :=
m∑
i=1
P il (4.7)
where P il := EQ
(
V i∗l+1 | FTl
)
for every i = 1, . . . ,m and l = 1, . . . , n − 1. Furthermore, we set
V0(s) = EQ(V1(s1)) since putting a tranche at time 0 is not allowed.
Observe that the continuation value of tranche i at time Tl is given as P
i
l = EQ(V
i∗
l+1 | FTl) for
every i. In equation (4.6), the term X il represents the payoff received by holder of tranche i when he
decides to put at time Tl, and the quantity in front of the indicator 1{ϑi>l} represents the expected
payoff of holder when he decides not to put the tranche. Upon summation, we can represent the
right-hand side in (4.6) as follows
V il (sl) := EQ
(
X iϑi(sl) +
ϑi(sl)−1∑
t=l
[
piH(Et(st),Xt,pt)
(
EQ
(
V ∗t+1 | FTt
))
− EQ
(
V ∗t+1 | FTt
)]i ∣∣∣∣FTl
)
(4.8)
where ϑi(sl) represents the index such that the random time Tϑi(sl) ≥ Tl is the first instance at which
tranche i is put. Hence the summation term in (4.8) represents the accumulated redistribution holder
i is required to pay as a result of other holders putting their tranches during [Tl, Tϑi(sl)).
It should be noted that game described in Definition 4.3 is nothing more than a suitable variant
of the game given by Definition 4.1 in [12]. The only difference is that, in [12], the multi-person game
is stopped as soon as at least one player decides to put his tranche. In that case, the expected payoff
is determined using, in particular, the value process of a virtual game played from this moment
onwards. Therefore, Definition 4.1 in [12] refers in fact to a family of the embedded games that start
at any date Tl; each of them ends as soon as someone ‘exercises’ (i.e., a holder puts his tranche,
using the present terminology). By contrast, in Definition 4.3, we formally specify a single game,
which is always played till expiration date T , but is otherwise specified in the same way as the game
studied in [12]. It is thus natural to conjecture that the two games share the same value process and
an optimal equilibrium. The validity of this conjecture will be established in Proposition 4.4. The
proof of this result utilises Theorem 1 in [11] (see also Theorem 3.12 in [12]).
We acknowledge that the game introduced in Definition 4.3 departs from the usual way in
which multi-person extensions of classic Dynkin games are defined (see, for instance, Hamade`ne and
Hassani [14, 15] or Karatzas and Li [22]), since we postulate that the expected payoff at time Tl
depends not only on exogenously specified payoff processes X1, . . . , Xm, but also on the value of the
embedded game started at Tl. This way of defining a game could seem unusual in the context of the
game theory, but it is perfectly consistent with the arbitrage pricing of derivative securities and the
concept of the market value, where the future decisions of investors need to be taken into account.
Also, in the case of a two-person game option, the corresponding Dynkin game is formally defined
using only the payoff processes, say X1 and X2. However, an equivalent formulation that utilises
processes X1 ≥ X2 and the continuation value P of the contract (or, equivalently, the associated
Dynkin game) is also possible and in fact it provides a better insight into competitive character of a
game option. However, since the gain of one party matches the loss of the counterparty, the trivial
mechanism of redistribution is already implicit in the two-person version of the game. Of course,
when m = 2, the game of Definition 4.3 reduces to the classic Dynkin game and a multi-person
contract with puttable tranches becomes a two-person game option.
Since it is possible for the issuer to simultaneously hold multiple tranches at one point, the price
additivity (see Definition 4.1) becomes an important issue. We hence need to check a sub-zero-sum
condition on the value V ∗0 . The most convenient solution is to enforce a restriction such as (4.9), so
that it will never be optimal for all holders to simultaneously put, and thus the contract will be a
zero-sum game between the holders.
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To ensure this property in the case of a contract described in Section 1.1, one should choose
strikes K1, . . . ,Km, classes of options (calls or puts), and the put payoffs X
1
l , . . . , X
m
l , l = 1, . . . , n
in such a way that it will be not ‘optimal’ (in the sense of maximisation of the value of a tranche)
for all holders to simultaneously give their tranches back to the issuer at some date Tl.
Proposition 4.4. Assume that the zero-sum condition
m∑
i=1
X il ≤
m∑
i=1
P il (4.9)
is satisfied recursively for l = 1, . . . , n. Then the multi-player game with puttable tranches admits
an optimal equilibrium s∗ and a unique value process V ∗ = V (s∗).
Proof. In the first step, we consider the penultimate date Tn. Then the continuation values P
1
n , . . . , P
m
n
are obtained by computing the continuation values for all tranches at time Tn using the standard
arbitrage pricing method. Consequently, the multi-person game with puttable tranches can be re-
duced at time Tn to a single-period zero-sum redistribution game ZRG(Xn, Pn, α) with αi =
1
m
for all i (see Definitions 3.1 and 3.10 in [12]). Therefore, the existence of an optimal equilibrium
s∗n = (τ
∗
n , σ
∗
n) (hence also of a unique value V
∗
n for the game at time Tn) follows from Theorem 1
in [11] (see also Theorem 3.12 in [12]). Specifically, the unique value for each individual tranche at
time Tn equals
V ∗n = V1(s
∗
n) = piS(Xn,pn)(Pn)
provided that
m∑
i=1
X in ≤ pn =
m∑
i=1
P in,
that is, it is not optimal for all players to put tranches at time Tn.
We now proceed by backward induction. We fix l = 1, . . . , n− 1, and we suppose that the value
at time Tl+1 is V
∗
l+1 = Vl+1(s
∗
l+1) where a strategy profile s
∗
l+1 is an optimal equilibrium for the game
on the time interval [Tl+1, Tn], meaning the following inequalities hold for every i and all strategies
τl+1 and σl+1
V il+1(τ
∗
l+1, σl+1) ≥ V
∗i
l+1 ≥ V
i
l+1(τl+1, σ
∗
l+1). (4.10)
Recall that the vector of continuation values at time Tl is given by P
i
l := EQ(V
∗i
l+1 | FTl) for all i.
Let us then suppose that the value V ∗l+1 of the game at time Tl+1, and thus also the continuation
values P 1l , . . . , P
m
l of tranches, before players’ decisions at time Tl were made, are given.
We define the strategy profile s∗l on [Tl, Tn] by postulating that: (i) the set of players who decide
to put the tranche at the time Tl equals
El(s
∗
l ) =
{
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} :
[
piS(Xl,pl)(Pl)
]i
= X il
}
(4.11)
and (ii) s∗l restricted to [Tl+1, Tn] coincides with s
∗
l+1. Using (4.8)–(4.7) and property (ii), we obtain
Vl(s
∗
l ) = piH(El(s∗l ),Xl,pl)(Pl)− Pl + EQ
(
Vl+1(s
∗
l+1) | FTl
)
= piH(El(s∗l ),Xl,pl)(Pl)
where the set El(s∗l ) is given by (4.11) and pl is given by (4.7). We aim to demonstrate that the
strategy profile s∗l is an optimal equilibrium on [Tl, Tn] and V
∗
l := Vl(s
∗
l ) is the game value at time
Tl. To this end, we need to show that, for every i,
V il (τ
∗
l , σl) ≥ V
i
l (s
∗
l ) = V
i
l (τ
∗
l , σ
∗
l ) ≥ V
i
l (τl, σ
∗
l ) (4.12)
for arbitrage strategy profiles τl and σl on [Tl, Tn], not necessarily coinciding with τ
∗
l+1 and σ
∗
l+1 on
[Tl+1, Tn].
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From Theorem 1 in [11] (or Theorem 3.12 in [12]), it is known that condition (i) characterises
an optimal equilibrium in the single-period game ZRG(Xl, Pl, α) and thus
Vl(s
∗
l ) = piH(El(s∗l ),Xl,pl)(Pl) = piS(Xl,pl)(Pl) (4.13)
provided that
∑m
i=1X
i
l ≤ pl. To be more specific, for every i = 1, . . . ,m and all strategies τl and σl
such that τl+1 = τ
∗
l+1 and σl+1 = σ
∗
l+1, we have
V¯ il (τ
∗
l , σl) =
[
piH(El(τ∗l ,σl),Xl,pl)(Pl)
]i
≥ [piS(Xl,pl)(Pl)]
i (4.14)
≥
[
piH(El(τl,σ∗l ),Xl,pl)(Pl)
]i
= V¯ il (τl, σ
∗
l )
where we write V¯ il , rather than V
i
l , to emphasise that we deal here with a single-period game on
[Tl, Tl+1], which is obtained by postulating that all strategy profiles that appear in the formula above
necessarily coincide with s∗l+1 on [Tl+1, Tn].
To show the Nash equilibrium property of s∗l at time Tl for the multi-player game given by
Definition 4.3, let us take any strategy profile τl for the holder of tranche i. If τl implies putting
tranche i at time Tl, then from (4.14), we obtain
V il (τl, σ
∗
l ) = X
i
l =
[
piH(El(τl,σ∗l ),Xl,pl)(Pl)
]i
≤ [piS(Xl,pl)(Pl)]
i = V il (s
∗
l ).
If τl does not imply putting tranche i at time Tl, then from (4.10), (4.13) and (4.14), we obtain
V il (τl, σ
∗
l ) =
[
piH(El(τl,σ∗l ),Xl,pl)(Pl)
]i
− P il + EQ
(
V il+1(τl+1, σ
∗
l+1) | FTl
)
≤ [piS(Xl,pl)(Pl)]
i − P il + EQ(V
∗i
l+1 | FTl) = V
i
l (s
∗
l ).
To verify the guaranteed payoff inequality, we take an arbitrary strategy profile σl and we use similar
arguments as above. If τ∗l implies putting tranche i at time Tl, then from (4.14), we obtain
V il (τ
∗
l , σl) = X
i
l =
[
piH(El(τ∗l ,σl),Xl,pl)(Pl)
]i
≥ [piS(Xl,pl)(Pl)]
i = V il (s
∗
l ).
If τ∗l does not imply putting tranche i at time Tl, then from (4.10), (4.13) and (4.14), we obtain
V il (τ
∗
l , σl) =
[
piH(El(τ∗l ,σl),Xl,pl)(Pl)
]i
− P il + EQ
(
V il+1(τ
∗
l+1, σl+1) | FTl
)
≥ [piS(Xl,pl)(Pl)]
i − P il + EQ(V
∗i
l+1 | FTl) = V
i
l (s
∗
l ).
We have thus shown that (4.12) holds for every i and all strategies τl and σl. This means that s
∗
l is
indeed an optimal equilibrium on [Tl, Tn] and V
∗
l is the value of the game at time Tl. Finally, the
value of the game at time 0 equals V ∗0 = EQ(V
∗
1 ), since putting a tranche at time 0 is not allowed.
One could also consider a simplified version of the game of Definition 4.3, which is specified as
follows: we assume that the vector Pn = (P
1
n , . . . , P
m
n ) is given and, for any strategy profile s on
[0, Tn], we set
Vn(sn) := piH(En(sn),Xn,pn)(Pn) (4.15)
and we define Vl(sl) recursively, for every l = 1, . . . , n− 1,
Vl(sl) := piH(El(sl),Xl,pl)
(
EQ
(
V ∗l+1 | FTl
))
where V ∗l+1 is the value of the subgame started at Tl+1 and pl, l = 1, . . . , n− 1 is given by (4.7) with
P il := EQ
(
V ∗il+1 | FTl
)
. For this game, Proposition 4.4 is still valid and its proof can be essentially
simplified.
It is less clear whether the following definition of the game would be suitable: we assume that
the vector Pn = (P
1
n , . . . , P
m
n ) is given and, for any strategy profile s on [0, Tn], we postulate that
(4.15) holds and we set, for every l = 1, . . . , n− 1,
Vl(sl) := piH(El(sl),Xl,p¯l(sl+1))
(
EQ
(
Vl+1(sl+1) | FTl
))
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where, for every l = 1, . . . , n− 1,
p¯l(sl+1) :=
m∑
i=1
EQ
(
V il+1(sl+1) | FTl
)
.
Unfortunately, this more flexible game is unlikely to possess an optimal equilibrium, in general, and
thus its specification should be complemented by further conditions.
Remark 4.2. One may wonder whether the multi-person game introduced in Definition 4.3 can be
solved using a reflected BSDE, as was demonstrated by Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [5] for two-person
Dynkin games. This is indeed the case, but it requires a judicious specification of the behaviour
of a solution to a multi-dimensional BSDE at the boundary. In [13], it was shown that the BSDE
approach can be applied in a discrete-time setting to solve the so-called multi-player affine games,
which cover the game of Definition 4.3 as a special case. The interested reader is also referred to
[29] where continuous-time multi-player stopping games are solved using multi-dimensional BSDEs
with oblique reflection.
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5 Appendix: Nash and Optimal Equilibria
We summarise here the basic results for Nash and optimal equilibria in a multi-player game. Let
M = {1, . . . ,m} be the set of players and let S stand for the class of all strategy profiles s =
(s1, . . . , sm). For each s ∈ S, we denote by V k(s) = V k(s1, . . . , sm) a (possibly random) payoff
of the kth player. It is convenient to write s = (σk, σ−k) and M−k = M \ {k}. An analogous
notational convention will be later applied to any proper subset N of M.
Definition 5.1. A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ S is called a Nash equilibrium if the inequality
V k(σk, σ−k) ≥ V k(sk, σ−k) holds for each k and all sk ∈ Sk. In other words, for each k ∈M,
V k(σk, σ−k) = ess sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, σ−k). (5.1)
Often (5.1) is written as V k(σk, σ−k) ≥ V k(sk, σ−k) for all sk ∈ Sk.
Let us now recall the notion of an optimal equilibrium, which is stronger than a by far more
widely used concept of a Nash equilibrium (although the two concepts coincide in the case of a
two-person zero-sum game).
Definition 5.2. A Nash equilibrium σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ S is called an optimal equilibrium if the
inequality V k(σk, σ−k) ≤ V k(σk, s−k) holds for each k ∈ M and all s−k ∈ S−k or, equivalently, for
each k ∈M,
V k(σk, σ−k) = ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(σk, s−k). (5.2)
Combining with condition (5.1) of a Nash equilibrium, σ satisfies
V k(σk, σ−k) = ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(σk, s−k) = ess sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, σ−k), (5.3)
or equivalently,
V k(σk, s−k) ≥ V k(σk, σ−k) ≥ V k(sk, σ−k), ∀ sk ∈ Sk, s−k ∈ S−k, (5.4)
for each k ∈M.
It is clear that an optimal equilibrium is essentially a saddle point. In addition to the properties
of a Nash equilibrium, each player can guarantee his optimal equilibrium payoff without knowing
the actions of other players. Furthermore, as shown in Corollary 5.1 below, all optimal equilibria
achieve the same value. The concept of an optimal equilibrium is also closely related to the maximin
and minimax values of the game. The maximin value is the maximum payoff player k can guarantee.
Definition 5.3. The maximin value V k equals
V k := ess sup
sk∈Sk
ess inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(sk, s−k). (5.5)
A maximin strategy for player k is any strategy ŝk ∈ Sk such that ess infs−k∈S−k V
k(ŝk, s−k) = V k,
that is, a strategy ŝk realises the supremum in (5.5).
The minimax value is the lowest payoff that the other players can force upon player k.
Definition 5.4. The minimax value V
k
equals
V
k
:= ess inf
s−k∈S−k
ess sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, s−k). (5.6)
A minimax strategy profile for the player set M−k is any strategy profile ŝ−k ∈ S−k such that the
equality ess supsk∈Sk V
k(sk, ŝ−k) = V
k
holds, that is, ŝ−k realises the infimum in (5.6).
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5.1 Value of a Game
In general, the maximin value never higher than the minimax value, since the players from the set
M−k cannot force the payoff of player k to be lower than an amount that can be guaranteed by him.
For this reason, the maximin value (minimax value, resp.) is also known as the lower value (the
upper value, resp.). The most fundamental properties of an optimal equilibrium are summarised in
the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. (i) The inequality V
k
≥ V k is valid for all k.
(ii) If σ is a Nash equilibrium, then V k(σ) ≥ V
k
for all k.
(iii) If σ satisfies (5.2), then for all k, V k(σ) ≤ V k.
(iv) If σ is an optimal equilibrium, then V k(σ) = V
k
= V k for all k.
(v) If σ is an optimal equilibrium, then for all k the strategy σk (the strategy profile σ−k, resp.) is
a maximin strategy for player k (a minimax strategy profile the players set M−k, resp.).
Proof. (i) For every ŝk ∈ Sk and ŝ−k ∈ S−k, we have that
G(ŝ−k) := sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, ŝ−k) ≥ V k(ŝk, ŝ−k) ≥ inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(ŝk, s−k) =: H(ŝk)
and thus G(s−k) ≥ H(sk) for every sk and s−k. Consequently,
V
k
= inf
s−k∈S−k
sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, s−k) = inf
s−k∈S−k
G(s−k)
≥ sup
sk∈Sk
H(sk) = sup
sk∈Sk
inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(sk, s−k) = V k.
(ii) If condition (5.1) holds then
V k(σk, σ−k) = sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, σ−k) ≥ inf
s−k∈S−k
sup
sk∈Sk
V k(sk, s−k) = V
k
.
(iii) If condition (5.2) holds then
V k(σk, σ−k) = inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(σk, s−k) ≤ sup
sk∈Sk
inf
s−k∈S−k
V k(sk, s−k) = V k.
(iv) If both conditions (5.1) and (5.2) hold, then by (ii) and (iii),
V k ≥ V k(σ) ≥ V
k
.
In view of (i), we thus obtain the equality V k(σ) = V
k
= V k.
(v) Combining (iv) with condition (5.4), we have,
V k(σk, s−k) ≥ V k(σk, σ−k) = V k, ∀ s−k ∈ S−k,
V k(sk, σ−k) ≤ V k(σk, σ−k) = V
k
, ∀ sk ∈ Sk.
Hence σk and σ−k are maximin and minimax strategies, respectively.
Proposition 5.1 motivates the following definition of values of the game.
Definition 5.5. If the equality V
k
= V k holds, then V ∗k := V
k
= V k is the value for player k.
The value of the game V ∗ is the vector (V ∗1, . . . , V ∗m) of values for all players.
Since the equality is not necessarily achieved in part (i) in Proposition 5.1, the existence of the
value is not guaranteed. However, by part (iv) in this proposition, the existence of an optimal
equilibrium implies the existence of the value of the game, so that we may state the following
corollary.
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Corollary 5.1. (i) If the value of the game V ∗ exists, then it is unique.
(ii) If there exists an optimal equilibrium σ, then the value exists for every player and
V (σ) = (V ∗1, . . . , V ∗m) = V ∗.
Hence every optimal equilibrium σ achieves the same value.
Proof. (i) is implicit in Definition 5.5 and (ii) follows immediately from Proposition 5.1 (iv). Finally
(iii) follows immediately from (i) and (ii).
5.2 Coalition Values
The maximin and minimax values, as well as strategy profiles, can be analogously defined for any
proper subset N of the set M of players, by simply replacing k with N . For any subset N ⊂ M,
we denote V N (s) :=
∑
i∈N V
i(s) and we write s = (sN , s−N ) for any strategy profile s ∈ S.
Let us now focus on a special case of a zero-sum game. It is worth noting that even in zero-sum
games, not all Nash equilibria are optimal equilibria.
Definition 5.6. A game is called zero-sum if VM(s) :=
∑
i∈M V
i(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
In the case of a zero-sum game, further properties an optimal equilibrium can be derived.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose that the game is zero-sum and denote by σ any strategy profile. Then
the following statements are equivalent:
(i) For each k ∈M, V k(σk, σ−k) ≤ V k(σk, s−k) for all s−k ∈ S−k.
(ii) For any proper subset N ⊂M, V N (σN , σ−N ) ≥ V N (sN , σ−N ) for all sN ∈ SN .
(iii) For any proper subset N ⊂M, V N (σN , σ−N ) ≤ V N (σN , s−N ) for all s−N ∈ S−N .
(iv) The strategy profile σ is an optimal equilibrium.
Proof. [(i) =⇒ (ii)] Intuitively, if each player k ∈ N can guarantee his payoff by using σk, then
collectively, the players ofN can guarantee their total payoff by playing σN . Since for all s−N ∈ S−N
we have (σN\{k}, s−N ) ∈ S−k. By (i),
V k(σN , σ−N ) = V k(σk, σN\{k}, σ−N ) ≤ V k(σk, σN\{k}, s−N ) = V k(σN , s−N ). (5.7)
Summing (5.7) over k ∈ N , we have
V N (σN , σ−N ) =
∑
k∈N
V k(σN , σ−N ) ≤
∑
k∈N
V k(σN , s−N ) = V N (σN , s−N ),
as required.
[(ii) =⇒ (i)] This is immediate by setting N = {k}.
[(ii)⇐⇒ (iii)] Since the game is zero-sum, V N (s) = −V −N (s) for all s ∈ S. Hence
V N (σN , σ−N ) ≤ V N (σN , s−N ), ∀ s−N ∈ S−N ,
⇐⇒ −V −N (σN , σ−N ) ≤ −V −N (σN , s−N ), ∀ s−N ∈ S−N ,
⇐⇒ V −N (σN , σ−N ) ≥ V −N (σN , s−N ), ∀ s−N ∈ S−N . (5.8)
Relabelling −N as N in (5.8) gives the desired result.
[(i) and (iii) =⇒ (iv)] From Definition 5.2, the definition of an optimal equilibrium, it is sufficient to
check (5.1)
V k(σk, σ−k) ≥ V k(sk, σ−k), ∀ sk ∈ Sk
and (5.2)
V k(σk, s−k) ≥ V k(σk, σ−k), ∀ s−k ∈ S−k.
This is clear as (i) is identical to (5.1), while (iii) reduces to (5.2) after setting N = {k}.
[(iv)⇐⇒ (i)] This is immediate from (5.2) in Definition 5.2.
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Note that the equivalence between Proposition 5.2 (i) and (ii) does not use the fact that the game
is zero-sum. Proposition 5.2 (iii) implies (5.1), the Nash equilibrium condition, but the converse does
not hold.
So far, the definition of the value referred to the value of the game to each individual player.
But suppose some subset of players N ⊆M is playing as a coalition with the goal to maximise the
coalition payoff V N (s) :=
∑
i∈N V
i(s). The definition of the value of the game can be extended as
follows.
Definition 5.7. The value V ∗N for the coalition N of players is given by
V ∗N := sup
sN∈SN
inf
s−N∈S−N
V N (sN , s−N ) = inf
s−N∈S−N
sup
sN∈SN
V N (sN , s−N ),
assuming that the second equality holds.
In general, the value V ∗N (if well defined) does not necessarily satisfy the additivity property
V ∗N =
∑
i∈N V
∗i. However, as the following propositions shows, if an optimal equilibrium exist in
a zero-sum game, then this property is indeed satisfied for any subset N of M.
Proposition 5.3. Suppose the game has an optimal equilibrium σ ∈ S with value V ∗ = V (σ). If
either (i) the game is zero-sum or (ii) VM(σ) = ess sups∈S V
M(s), then for all subsets N ⊆M, we
have that
V N (σ) =
∑
i∈N
V ∗i = V ∗N = sup
sN∈SN
inf
s−N∈S−N
V N (sN , s−N ) = inf
s−N∈S−N
sup
sN∈SN
V N (sN , s−N ).
In particular, the value of the game for any coalition N of players is equal to the sum of values for
players from N .
Proof. Since case (ii) includes the zero-sum case (i), it suffices to establish the result for case (ii)
only. Since σ is an optimal equilibrium, each player i ∈M can guarantee the payoff V i(σ), in other
words,
V i(σ) = inf
s−i∈S−i
V i(σi, s−i).
So the players from N can play to guarantee V N (σ) by playing σN ,
V N (σ) =
∑
i∈N
inf
s−i∈S−i
V i(σi, s−i) ≤
∑
i∈N
V i(σN , s−N ) = V N (σN , s−N ), ∀ s−N ∈ S−N .
Hence
V N (σ) ≤ inf
s−N∈S−N
V N (σN , s−N ) ≤ sup
sN∈SN
inf
s−N∈S−N
V N (sN , s−N ). (5.9)
Applying the same argument to the player set −N , they can also guarantee their payoff V −N (σ),
V −N (σ) ≤ V −N (sN , σ−N ), ∀ sN ∈ SN .
Now by condition (ii) VM(σ) = sups∈S V
M(s), we must have, for all sN ∈ SN ,
V N (σ) = VM(σ) − V −N (σ) ≥ VM(sN , σ−N )− V −N (sN , σ−N ) = V N (sN , σ−N ).
Hence
V N (σ) ≥ sup
sN∈SN
V N (sN , σ−N ) ≥ inf
s−N∈S−N
sup
sN∈SN
V N (sN , s−N ). (5.10)
Finally, the required result follows immediately by combining (5.9) and (5.10) with the following
fact (see 5.1 (i)),
inf
s−N∈S−N
sup
sN∈SN
V N (sN , s−N ) ≥ sup
sN∈SN
inf
s−N∈S−N
V N (sN , s−N ),
completing the proof.
